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This thesis consists of three papers that study the relationships between information, competition,
and cooperation in two novel environments. We first examine the competitive behavior of firms with
private information in two-sided matching markets. This part of the thesis employs purely game-
theoretic tools. Second, we study voluntary contributions towards a linear public good by players
who are connected through a network. In this environment, we use experimental and theoretical
techniques to examine the effects of different information treatments and network structures on
contributions.
In Chapter 2, I study the behavior of firms in a competitive market for workers. In particular,
I study a game in which firms with private information compete for workers by committing to a
single salary offer. Workers care only about salary and the matching process follows the deferred-
acceptance approach introduced by Gale & Shapley (1962). For a two-firm, two-worker model,
there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which each firm type chooses a distributional strategy
with interval support in the salary space. This equilibrium exhibits a separation of types, in the
sense that types with a common most preferred worker choose nonoverlapping, adjacent supports.
The type that makes higher offers is determined by the relative marginal value for the preferred
worker. In larger markets, which replicate the two-firm, two-worker case, a comparable Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium exists and the separation result endures. In the limit, there is no aggregate
uncertainty about the realization of firm types, and competition is confined to the most popular
worker type. Numerical results suggest that the finite market equilibrium strategies converge with
replication to the corresponding equilibrium strategies in the limit case.
Chapter 3 studies individual contributions in a repeated public goods experiment. Subjects are
vi
connected through a circle network, and consumption of the public good depends on a player’s own
contribution and the contributions of his neighbors. We study whether contributions depend on the
nature of the information players are shown about others between rounds of the repeated game. We
extend the approach of Arifovic & Ledyard (2009), which merges a modified model of other-regarding
preferences (ORP) with a theory of learning. Our model predicts individual behavior that ranges
from free-riding, to conditional cooperation, to unconditional giving. Many subjects switch between
these different behavioral strategies across games with different information treatments. Individual
contributions are remarkably consistent with our model, which combines other-regarding preferences,
learning, and the information treatment. Both the data and model simulations suggest that learning
(to play the benchmark Nash equilibrium of the game) is differential and contagious across players.
Free-riders and unconditional givers learn faster than conditional cooperators, and provide an anchor
that accelerates learning by their neighbors. These results suggest that the network or neighborhood
structure may be important for contributions through its effects on learning.
In Chapter 4, we extend the analysis of learning and contributions in network public goods
experiments. Using a set of five different network structures, we examine three key aspects of
individual behavior. First, we report a negative finding regarding the predictions from our theory of
other-regarding preferences. The theory provides certain predictions about how a particular subject
should and should not behave across networks. We find several violations of these predictions,
particularly in small, complete network groups, but also in the larger, more interesting networks.
Second, we report on the average contributions by players in groups that consist of all conditional
cooperators. In the one-shot game, these groups have a continuum of equilibria, in which every
player contributes the same amount. While one might expect contributions to average half of the
endowment, we find in both the data and learning simulations that average contributions decline
over time to less than half of the endowment. We conjecture that learning dynamics may provide a
method of equilibrium selection, for players trying to coordinate on one equilibrium in the repeated
game.
Our main finding in this chapter is that learning is contagious in networks other than the circle,
vii
which we studied in Chapter 3. We find considerable evidence at the individual match level that
free-riders and altruists provide an anchor that stabilizes behavior and accelerates learning by their
conditional cooperator neighbors. Our analysis highlights the possibility that, even when the distri-
bution of free-riders, altruists, and conditional cooperators is the same across networks, the different
neighborhood structures may affect contributions differently through their effects on learning. Thus,
the main contribution of this chapter is the confirmation that learning is contagious across a range
of different network structures.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The three papers in this thesis share a common focus on strategic settings where information plays
a prominent role. We study two novel settings in which information is particularly important;
(1) salary competition in two-sided matching markets when there is private information; and (2)
voluntary contributions in a network public goods game.
The first setting is studied under complete information by several prominent authors, including
Bulow and Levin (2006), Kojima (2007), and Niederle (2007). However, there is relatively little
work that examines the problem when there is private information. In Chapter 2, we study the
equilibrium salary offers made by firms with private information, who compete for workers in a
two-sided matching market.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we switch focus to voluntary contributions in network public goods games.
This setting is part of a newer, developing literature that studies behavior in games played on
networks.1 The first study of public goods on networks is Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), who
prove for any social network structure, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which self-interested
agents either contribute everything or nothing. In this thesis, we consider different informational
assumptions regarding what the agents know, or can observe about the network. Moreover, we
assume that agents can have other-regarding preferences, rather than make the classical assumption
that agents are purely self-interested.
In the experimental literature on voluntary contributions to linear public goods, there is a well-
1A fairly comprehensive study is conducted by Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010) for an
extensive range of games.
2documented inconsistency between the theory and experimental data. This has generated a great
deal of work on alternative theories, including other-regarding preferences, repeated game strate-
gies, and learning. Although these have met with some success, none of the alternative theories
has provided on its own, a successful explanation for all the stylized facts that are evident in the
experimental data. One of the more successful approaches is the recent theory provided by Arifovic
and Ledyard (2009), who merge a model of other-regarding preferences with an evolutionary-style
learning model called Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL). Arifovic & Ledyard use their model
to produce simulated behavior that is remarkably close to the data observed across a wide range
of public goods experiments in the existing literature. We provide a full behavioral model that ex-
tends the approach developed by Arifovic and Ledyard (2009). We extend the model to the network
public goods environment, and incorporate the different informational assumptions into the learning
dynamics.
One of the key findings in the experimental public goods literature is that many players are
conditional cooperators, in the sense that they tend to contribute more when others contribute more
(and less when others contribute less). This notion of conditional cooperation raises two motivating
questions, which we consider in Chapter 3. First, how does conditional cooperation depend on the
nature of information players observe about others between rounds of a repeated game? We argue that
information can inform both how, and on what the players condition their contribution decisions.
Second, how does conditional cooperation depend on the structure of interaction between players? In
particular, since players are connected through a network, information about a player’s neighbors’
neighbors may be important for determining how much to contribute.
The main contribution in Chapters 3 and 4 is the finding that learning (to play the Nash equi-
librium of the network public goods game) is contagious across several different network structures.
This result suggests an important relationship between learning and neighborhood structure in games
played on networks.
In Chapter 3, we focus on a single network structure (the circle network), while varying the
information players are shown between rounds of a repeated network public goods game. We first
3show that variation in the informational treatments within the experiments can induce a subject with
stable underlying preference parameters to switch the form of his equilibrium behavior between free-
riding (always contributing zero), unconditional giving (always contributing his endowment), and
conditional cooperation. The data exhibits a significant amount of switching within-subject, which
we show can be attributed to changes in the informational treatment, rather than a product of
instability in players’ underlying types. We then show that, while contributions typically do not
converge to the Nash equilibrium of the static version of the game, they are consistent with the
simulated behavior generated by our full behavioral model. In this chapter is where we first provide
evidence for the main result that learning is contagious throughout the network.
In Chapter 4, we extend the analysis to a wider set of network structures. In all of the network
environments, players participate in a 10-period repeated network public goods game. After each
round, subjects observe the average payoff in their neighborhood, which is defined by network. As
in Chapter 3, our specification of other-regarding preferences provides a set of cutoff conditions
on a player’s preference parameters, which allow us to classify players as free-riders, conditional
cooperators, or pure altruists in any given game. From a static point of view, the classifications
within-subject are inconsistent with the predictions of our theory of preferences, although these may
be exacerbated by sample size issues or the coarseness of our classification criteria. Nevertheless, this
negative result merely highlights further that contributions across different networks are sensitive
not only to the composition of free-riders, altruists, and conditional cooperators, but also to the
configuration of those players on the networks.
Chapter 4 also analyzes average contributions in groups comprising all conditional cooperators,
which according to the static other-regarding preferences model, possess a continuum of equilibria.
We find that both the data and learning simulations for these environments decline steadily over
time, to an average contribution below half of the endowment. We conjecture that this decline is
related to the learning dynamics, and that the learning process may provide an interesting method
for equilibrium selection in these groups with multiple Nash equilibria.
Finally, our main finding in Chapter 4 is that learning is also contagious across the additional
4network structures, particularly in the connected cliques and two-step circle networks. We study
the data at the individual match level and compare the results with some simple predictions of
contagious learning in each realized match. For the most part, the data is consistent with the learning
simulations, but even when it is not, the contributions exhibit a pattern consistent with contagious
learning. Thus, our primary contribution from Chapters 3 and 4 is to show that contributions
depend on the network structure through its effects on learning by conditional cooperators.
5Chapter 2
Salary Competition in Two-Sided
Matching Markets with Private
Information
2.1 Introduction
In many labor markets, firms compete with each other for workers along several dimensions. These
include salary, employee benefits, bonuses, health insurance coverage, and opportunities for career
advancement. Firms often set policies regarding benefits, bonuses, health plans, and vacation time,
rather than personalize the terms of employment for each individual worker. It is also common
for firms to decide on a salary for a particular position, rather than negotiate a salary with each
individual employee. These terms of employment can be inflexibile, either because they are firm-wide
policies, contractual obligations, or because the salary for the position has been widely advertised.
There are other settings in which agents on one side of a market make a costly investment in order
to compete for the services (or affections) of the agents on the other side of the market. However,
this paper focuses on the case of salary competition between firms. When choosing the terms of
employment to offer to workers, each firm considers the preferences (or types) of the other firms.
However, in most cases, the firms do not have full information about each other. This paper examines
the competitive behavior of firms when they do not know each others’ preferences.
There are several other papers that study salary competition in two-sided markets with complete
6information, in particular by Bulow and Levin (2006), Niederle (2007), and Kojima (2007).1 Bulow
and Levin (2006) consider the effect of a centralized matching mechanism on salary levels, and argue
that the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm compresses and depresses the
salaries of workers, relative to the competitive equilibrium. These papers are also related to ear-
lier research that deals with matching firms to workers by incorporating salary offers. The earliest
treatment of matching with salaries appears to be Shapley and Shubik (1972), which modifies Gale
and Shapley (1962) to incorporate a transferrable utility good in which salaries can be paid. The
literature was further developed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and subsequently, by Kelso and
Crawford (1982), who devised a salary adjustment process which converges to a core allocation.2
More recently, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) develop a model of matching with contracts that incor-
porates the Kelso and Crawford (1982) model.3 They show that if the preferences of the firms satisfy
a gross substitutes condition and a law of aggregate demand condition, then truthful reporting is a
dominant strategy for workers in a worker-proposing matching mechanism.
While matching with salaries has attracted considerable interest, the existing literature does not
include a model in which the firms’ preference orderings over workers are private information. Hoppe,
Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) introduce a model of assortative matching in which there is incomplete
information on both sides of the market, however, the incomplete information in their setting relates
to attributes of potential partners, rather than preference orderings of potential competitors. Once
a worker has chosen a signal in their model, every firm has the same ranking over workers, based
on their signals. Likewise, once a firm has chosen a signal, every worker has the same ranking over
firms. In contrast, the objective of this paper is to understand the effects of private information
about the preference orderings of potential competitors on salary competition. The model extends
the approach taken by most of the literature by allowing firms to have different primitive preference
orderings over the set of workers. This assumption then allows for firms’ preferences to be private
1Another paper that investigates the importance of various assumptions in the Bulow and Levin (2006) model is
Gonzalez-Diaz and Siegel (Forthcoming), who focus on a set of job features, including salaries, reputation, responsibil-
ity, work hours, training, and quality of facilities, that may affect a hospital’s attractiveness to workers in a nonlinear
manner.
2A core allocation in this context is a one-to-one matching along with a salary schedule, in which no firm and
no worker can negotiate a salary at which they would prefer each other over their current partners at their current
salaries.
3Other related work includes Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), and Crawford (2008).
7information, which is the main point of departure from the existing literature on matching with
salaries.
Outline
Consider a game in which firms with private information compete for workers by making a single
salary offer. Suppose each firm wants to hire at most one worker, and each worker can work for only
one firm. Firms have types, defined by their preferences over the set of workers, and the option to
remain unmatched. A key assumption is that firms’ types are private information, although there is
a common prior distribution over the type space. On the other hand, the workers all rank the firms
in order of salary, from highest to lowest.4 A firm must commit to a single salary offer, which they
are required to pay to the worker with whom they are eventually matched. If they are unmatched,
they do not pay anything. Although the problem is presented as one of choosing salaries to offer
to potential workers, the firms’ decisions can also be interpreted as investments in other terms of
employment (such as benefits programs, health plans, or available facilities) that make the firm
attractive to potential employees. Under either interpretation, firms are denied the flexibility to
personalize the offers made to different workers for the same position.
Once salaries are chosen, the firms and workers are matched in the following manner. Each firm
makes an offer to at most one worker. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer and rejects all
the other offers it receives. Any firm who is rejected then makes the same offer to another worker who
has not already rejected the firm. When no new offers are made, all remaining tentative matches are
confirmed. This matching process is analogous to the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) to prove the existence of stable matchings. A nice property
of the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is that it gives firms a dominant strategy to
make offers in a straightforward manner. In the present environment, this means that firms have a
dominant strategy to make offers in order of preference, but only to workers who are acceptable to
the firm at its chosen salary. Furthermore, since all workers care only about salary, there is a unique
stable matching for any profile of firm preferences and salary offers. As a result, no worker has an
4This is a significant assumption, which eliminates the possibility of strategic behavior at the matching stage, as
it induces a unique stable matching.
8incentive to strategically reject an offer. Thus, the focus in this paper is on the salary decisions
made by the firms.
In this paper, we begin by analyzing a two-firm, two-worker model, in which the firms can be
one of four types. Type a prefers worker w1 to worker w2 whilst type b considers only worker w1 to
be acceptable. Similarly, type c prefers w2 to w1 while type d only considers w2 to be acceptable.
In the two-firm, two-worker model, there are no pure strategy equilibria. However, there exists a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed (distributional) strategies which are continuous with interval
support.
The first result of the paper is that the equilibrium exhibits a separation of types, in the sense
that between two types who have a common most preferred worker, one type always makes higher
offers than the other type. For example, given certain parameters, every salary offered with positive
probability by a type b firm (who only wants worker w1) is higher than any salary offered with positive
probability by a type a firm (who also wants w1 the most, but considers w2 to be acceptable). That
is, all type a firms “accept defeat” in case the other firm is a type b firm. Instead, type a firms
concentrate on competing against another type a firm. The relative marginal value attached to
the workers by different types determines which type makes the higher offers in equilibrium. When
the realized types do not share a common most preferred type, there is no competitive pressure on
the salary offers. Therefore, the relative probabilities of being either type a or type b, compared
with type c or type d, also affects the equilibrium salaries. Furthermore, more popular workers (as
determined ex-ante by the distribution over firm types), attract higher average equilibrium salaries.
Likewise, as one might expect, the higher the probability of facing a given firm type, the higher the
average salary offered by that type of firm in equilibrium.
The paper extends the analysis to larger markets by replicating the two-firm, two-worker model.
The second result proves the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional
strategies with interval support for each finite replicated market. The proof, which is by construc-
tion, also establishes the separation result for types with a common most preferred worker class.
In the limit, when there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, there is no aggre-
9gate uncertainty about the realization of types. Thus, competition in equilibrium is confined to the
most popular worker class. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that the finite market equilib-
rium strategies converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium strategies as the number of
replications approaches infinity.
A related environment with a fixed, or posted wage is studied by Burdett & Mortensen (1998).
They study a game where a continuum of firms choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of
workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers. Workers search both while unemployed
and while employed for a job with an acceptable, or higher wage, respectively. Firms post a wage
conditional on the search behavior of the workers and the wages offered by other firms.
The principal result in Burdett & Mortensen (1998) is that wage dispersion is a robust outcome
when workers must search for individual offers, provided that workers search while employed as
well as when unemployed. They characterize the unique equilibrium (steady state) distribution
of wage offers under different assumptions about firm and worker heterogeneity. The equilibrium
distribution is non degenerate, exhibiting wage dispersion, even when all firms and workers are
respectively identical, as long as the arrival rate of job offers is strictly positive, but finite, for all
workers (even those already employed).
There are several important differences between the setup and the matching process in Burdett
& Mortensen (1998) and our approach in this paper. First, in this paper, firms have single-unit
demand. That is, each firm wants to be matched with just one worker, rather than build up a team
of workers. Second, workers are not identical in our model. Offers are directed by firms to particular
workers, rather than posted for workers to search for and accept as they please. This reflects the
assumption that firm productivities depend also on which worker they employ and the additional
heterogeneity in firms’ ordinal preferences. In particular, some workers are not acceptable to a firm
at that firm’s posted salary.
An important implication of these differences is that, in our model, each worker faces a potentially
different distribution of offers. Firms have both different ordinal preferences (and productivities) and
may offer different salaries, whilst controlling which workers may receive their offer. Nevertheless,
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the models are related, since we can interpret the ‘continued search’ feature of Burdett & Mortensen
(1998) as an ongoing matching process which evolves towards a stable, steady state equilibrium
matching. In this respect, the assumption that employed workers continue to search for higher
paying jobs is equivalent to a provisionally matched worker receiving a higher salary offer in a
deferred acceptance mechanism.
In our paper, the equilibrium salary distributions offered by different firm types also exhibit wage
dispersion (both within and among the types). However, the wage dispersion is driven by private
information among the firms and the competition by heterogeneous firms for heterogeneous workers.
In contrast, the wage dispersion in Burdett & Mortensen (1998) is driven in part by the multi-
unit demands of the firms, and their heterogeneous productivities with respect to a set of perfectly
substitutable workers. In fact, in this paper, the highest productivity firm for a given worker is
not necessarily matched with that worker. Workers are instead sorted to firms based (generally)
on the firms’ relative marginal values for the different workers, which depend on the firms’ ordinal
preferences as well as the relative intensity of preferences (marginal productivities) for each of the
workers, compared with the other firms.
Another related paper is Bulow and Levin (2006). In their paper, Bulow and Levin provide a
concise argument that in a two-sided market with a centralized matching procedure, equilibrium
salaries are lower than the corresponding competitive equilibrium. The matching of firms to workers
is still highly efficient, which implies that the lower salaries are mostly offset by higher profits for
the firms. Moreover, they show that the equilibrium supports for the salary distributions offered are
more compressed for better workers, such that the most productive firms gain the most from the
centralized match.
Both the setup and the results of our paper can be distinguished from Bulow and Levin (2006).
The primary innovation in our model is to allow different firms to have different ordinal preferences
over the same set of workers. This extends the approach followed in almost all the previous literature,
including Bulow and Levin (2006). Also notice that this innovation is not the same as allowing for
heterogeneous productivity types if the heterogeneity does not lead to a different preference ordering.
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Rather, it allows for a broader range of types, and facilitates the introduction of a richer notion of
private information to two-sided matching markets.
In Bulow and Levin (2006), each firm brings a degree of productivity to their match. Likewise,
each worker possesses a fixed level of productivity. The value created in any match is determined by
multiplying together the two productivities. One implication of this setup is that each of the set of
firms, and the set of workers can be objectively ranked or organized from most productive to least
productive. Then the efficient matching outcome involves an assortative match between the most
productive firm and worker, followed by the second most productive firm and worker, and so on.
In their model, productivities are complete information, and more importantly, every firm has the
same preference ordering over the set of workers.
In this environment, there is no scope for introducing private information, except about the firm’s
own ranking among the other firms. But regardless of where the firm ranks in terms of productivity,
all firms will share the same preference ordering over workers, such that the problem becomes a
matter of determining ‘where you stand’ in the objective ranking of the firms. In contrast, the
features of our model create uncertainty about the productivities of the agents on the other side
of the market. That is, firms do not all agree on the value of matching with a particular worker.
This gives rise to a situation in which, even though one firm may be less productive than another,
the latter firm values the former firm’s second choice worker more than his first choice worker. By
removing the restriction that all firms prefer the same workers, we create situations where the degree
of competition between firms is uncertain.
In complete information environments, firms can perfectly deduce the level of competitive pres-
sure they will face when attempting to hire a particular worker. For instance, in the Bulow and
Levin (2006) setup, firms observe the productivities of other firms and can predict which firms they
will need to compete with or outbid to be matched with a particular worker. In our setup, there is an
additional dimension which affects the level of competitive pressure. Depending on the realization
of firms’ types, a competitive equilibrium may distribute all the surplus from matches to the firms
(salaries close to zero), split the surplus between workers and firms, or even transfer all of the surplus
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to the workers. For instance, in a two-firm, two-worker market, when both firms want worker a and
only worker a, the strong competitive pressure will drive the salary up to the lower of the two firms’
marginal values for worker a. On the other hand, if one firm prefers worker a to worker b, while the
other prefers worker b to worker a, there is no competitive pressure, and the firms can post a salary
equal to (or close to) zero, retaining all surplus from the match.
Furthermore, in this setting, even with complete information, the centralized matching equilib-
rium salaries do not always depress salaries relative to the corresponding competitive equilibria.
When firms have different most preferred workers, the matching equilibrium salaries are equal to
the lowest competitive equilibrium salaries, but when firms have the same most preferred worker,
the matching equilibrium salaries equal the highest corresponding competitive equilibrium salaries.
Our results reflect that with private information, the firms face an uncertain level of competitive
pressure. Thus, the equilibrium salaries tend to redistribute the surplus more evenly between firms
and workers. Since individual firms do not know the precise realization of all firms’ types, they are
unable to extract all surplus when competitive pressure is low, nor are they forced to transfer all
surplus to workers when competitive pressure is high.
We also show that competition between firms is localized. Specifically, when two different firm
types have a common most preferred worker, each type focuses on competing against other firms of
their own type. For example, if one type prefers a to b to remaining unmatched, while the other type
also prefers a most but prefers to be unmatched over b, the type with a higher marginal value for a
will pay a ‘premium’ large enough to outbid a firm of the other type, then choose a salary distribution
that focuses on competing with another firm of their own type. This separation result is the primary
feature of the equilibrium characterization in this paper, for both the two-firm, two-worker markets,
and the larger, replicated markets. This localized nature of competition is different from the notion
of localized competition discussed by Bulow and Levin (2006). In their setup, localized competition
occurs in a framework where competitive pressure is readily observed, so that firms know which
worker they are likely to be matched with, and which other firms (those with similar productivity)
will be competing with them for that worker.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model and the matching
process, then introduces the general two-firm, two-worker game with private information. A simple
example demonstrates the main features of the equilibrium and the intuition behind the behavior of
the firms. Section 2.3 characterizes the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for which strategies are
continuous distributions with interval support. The characterization also establishes the separation
result for a general two-firm, two-worker model with private information. In Section 2.4, the model is
extended to larger markets. This section characterizes the equilibria of the limit case in which there
are a continuum of firms and workers, then proves existence for finite replicated markets. Finally,
Section 2.5 presents the numerical simulations, which show that the equilibrium strategies in finite
replicated markets converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium strategies as the number
of replications approaches infinity.
2.2 A Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
Suppose there are two firms f1, f2 ∈ F and two workers w1, w2 ∈W . Each firm has strict preferences
over the set {w1, w2, ∅}, where ∅ represents being unmatched. It is safe to ignore any preference rank-
ing in which remaining single is the most preferred option. Thus, there are four possible preference
rankings for each firm.
Pa : w1 w2 ∅ Pb : w1 ∅w2
Pc : w2 w1 ∅ Pd : w2 ∅w1.
Assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values, one for each worker, while
the value of remaining unmatched is 0. This assumption is somewhat restrictive, since it means that
two firms with same preference ranking also have the same values for the workers. In Section 2.6, I
discuss ways to relax this assumption about the type space.
Refer to a firm with preferences Pk as a firm of type k. Then the set of firm types is described
as Pf = {a, b, c, d} where, for example, a = (a1, a2) and aj is the value of worker j to type a for
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each j = 1, 2. In order to represent the preference rankings, the values of the different types must
satisfy the following conditions.
a1 > a2 > 0
b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0
d2 > 0 > d1 .
Definition 2.2.1. A worker w is acceptable to firm f if f prefers w to remaining unmatched.
The second definition modifies the standard notion of an acceptable worker to account for the
preferences of the firms at a given salary level.
Definition 2.2.2. Given any salary, xf , chosen by firm f , a worker w is salary-acceptable to
firm f if f ’s value for worker w is greater than xf .
The values corresponding to each type are common knowledge, however, each firm knows only
its own type. The types are drawn independently according to a common prior distribution pi over
Pf = {a, b, c, d}. Given the two disjoint sets of agents, define a matching as follows.
Definition 2.2.3. A matching is a function µ : F ∪W → F ∪W ∪ ∅ such that
(1) µ(f) ∈W ∪ ∅ for all f ∈ F ,
(2) µ(w) ∈ F ∪ ∅ for all w ∈W , and
(3) µ(µ(i)) = i for all i ∈ F ∪W with µ(i) 6= ∅.
Let M denote the set of all matchings.
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For any firm f with type k = (k1, k2), the utility derived from a matching µ ∈M is given by
ufk(µ) =

k1 if µ(f) = w1
k2 if µ(f) = w2
0 if µ(f) = ∅
.
Before the matching is determined, the firms each choose a salary. Then the matching outcome is
determined as follows.
Step 1. Each firm makes an offer to (at most) one worker;
Step 2. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer, and rejects all others;
...
Step k. Any firm whose most recent offer was rejected may make the same salary offer to a worker
who has not already rejected them;
Step k+1. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer out of the one (if any) it tentatively holds,
and the new offers received at Step k, and rejects all others.
The procedure terminates when no new offers are made, and then all tentative matches are confirmed.
In principle, both the firms and workers could adopt a large number of different strategies, some
of which may be incredibly complex. However, the following two remarks, which are standard results
from the matching theory literature, allow us to ignore any strategic behavior at the matching stage.
Remark 2.2.4. For any set of chosen salaries, each firm has a dominant strategy to make offers
in order of preference to salary-acceptable workers only.
Remark 2.2.5. For any profile of firm preferences and any set of chosen salaries, each worker has
a dominant strategy to reject all but the highest salary offered to them.
Since there are no incentives for strategic sequencing of offers by the firms, or for strategic
rejection by the workers, the rest of the paper focuses on the behavior of the firms when they
decide upon a salary. In fact, it is useful to describe the outcomes from the matching process by a
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direct revelation outcome function g. Let g : P × R2+ →M be an outcome function that maps the
preferences (types) of the two firms and the salaries chosen by the firms into the set of matchings.
Firms have a dominant strategy to announce their true preferences over salary-acceptable workers
and the workers simply reject all but the highest offer made to them.
2.2.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
Consider the game Γ =
(
F,W,P,R+, pi,g, {ufk}f,k
)
, which consists of the sets of firms F , and
workers W , the firm type space P, the space of possible salaries R+, and the type distribution pi.
The outcome function g represents the matching process described by Steps 1, 2, ...k+1, and {ufk}f,k
are the utility functions for each firm and each firm type over the set of matchings.
A pure strategy for a firm f is a function sf : Pf → R+ which selects a salary for each possible
firm type. Given a strategy s−f for the other firm, firm f ’s expected payoff from announcing a
salary xf when its type is k is given by
EUfk
(
xf , s−f ,
)
=
∑
p∈P−f
pi(p) · ufk [g (k, p, xf , s−f (p))] .
The following arguments establish that there is no pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium to the
game, Γ.
Consider any arbitrary pair of strategies (s1, s2) and suppose firm 1’s type is a. Notice that, if
firm 2’s type is either of c or d, then regardless of s1(a), firm 1 is matched with worker w1. However,
if firm 2’s type is a or b, then the outcome depends on the salaries announced by the firms. If firm
2 is playing s2, then firm 1’s best response is to announce s1(a) = max{s2(a), s2(b)} + ε as long
as s1(a) ≤ a1 − a2. If max{s2(a), s2(b)} ≥ a1 − a2, then firm 1’s best response is to announce
s1(a) = 0. However, given the choice of firm 1, s1(a) = max{s2(a), s2(b)}+ε, firm 2’s best response,
if it is type a, is to offer s2(a) = s1(a) + ε, up to s2(a) ≤ a1 − a2. The same type of incremental
best responses exist for type b firms, and by symmetry, also for types c and d. Thus, the problem
with pure strategies is that firms who have a common most preferred worker will continue to outbid
17
each other until the marginal benefit of ‘winning’ the worker is equal to the marginal benefit of not
winning. However, once that point is reached, the best response is to announce a salary of 0, and
begin the bidding-up process all over again.
2.2.2 Distributional (Mixed) Strategy Equilibria
Formally, a mixed (or distributional) strategy for firm i is a function σi : P → ∆(R+) which
announces, for each preference type, a distribution over salaries in R+. For simplicity, refer to the
symmetric equilibrium (σ∗, σ∗) by the equilibrium strategy σ∗ = (G∗a, G
∗
b , G
∗
c , G
∗
d) where G
∗
k is the
cumulative distribution announced by a firm whose type is k. I assume that strategies are continuous
distributions with interval support.5 Before turning to the results, it is useful to work through a
simple example for the two-firm, two-worker model.
Example 2.2.6. Suppose a = (2, 1), b = (2,−1), c = (1, 2), and d = (−1, 2), while pi(a) = 12 ,
pi(b) = 18 , pi(c) =
1
4 , and pi(d) =
1
8 . Notice that the marginal benefit to getting worker w1 is higher
for type b than type a, and the marginal benefit to getting worker w2 is higher for type d than type c.
Given these parameters, a natural conjecture is that type b firms will make higher offers than type a
firms, and type d firms will make higher offers than type c firms. Furthermore, given the distribution
of types pi, worker w1 is ex ante more popular (or believed to be more popular) than w2. As such,
one might expect to see higher salaries on average being offered to w1.
For this example, there exists an equilibrium, which is described as follows:
G∗a(x) = 2x on the support
[
0,
1
2
]
G∗b(x) =
7x− 3.5
2− x on the support
[
1
2
,
11
16
]
G∗c(x) = 4x on the support
[
0,
1
4
]
G∗d(x) =
7x− 1.75
2− x on the support
[
1
4
,
15
32
]
.
This equilibrium exhibits several interesting features. First, there is no overlap between the
5There may be other types of symmetric equilibria, with noninterval support, or discontinuous strategies. In
addition, there may be asymmetric equilibria.
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equilibrium supports of types with a common most preferred worker. Since the marginal value of
getting worker w1 is less for type a than for type b, firms of type b always announce higher salaries
than firms of type a. In other words, firms of type a are resigned to getting their second favorite
worker (w2) when the other firm is type b. Instead, a type a firm focuses just on competing against
another type a firm.
On the other hand, a type b firm offers enough to ensure that it outbids any type a firm, then
focuses on competing against the chance that the other firm is a type b. This type of‘separation
result between types a and b is also exhibited by types c and d, and as will be shown in Section 2.3,
is a characteristic of any equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval support.
Second, equilibrium salaries are higher on average for firms of type a than type c and for type b
than type d, even though they have comparable values for their respective preferences. This reflects
the relative popularity of worker w1 over worker w2. This notion of popularity is manifested in the
differences in the probabilities of facing another firm with the same most preferred worker. For types
a and b, the probability of facing another type a or b is 58 , while for types c and d, the probability
of facing another type c or d is only 38 . As a result, the average salaries offered in equilibrium are
higher for type a than type c, and higher for type b than type d. Section 2.3 confirms that this
feature is a general result that applies to all equilibria of the game.
2.3 Equilibria in the Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
Consider the general two-firm, two-worker model. It is relatively straightforward to show that the
strategies of types that share a common most preferred worker affect each other. On the other
hand, salaries do not affect the matching output when the realized types do not have a common
most preferred worker. Thus, pairs of types with common most preferred workers can be considered
in isolation from one another. Without loss of generality, consider types a and b. The following two
lemmas allow us to characterize the supports for the equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 2.3.1. Between types with a common most preferred worker, the lowest salary offered in
19
equilibrium must be 0.
Proof 1. Let [xa, xa] and [xb, xb] be the equilibrium supports for types a and b, respectively. Suppose
by means of contradiction that neither xa nor xb is equal to 0. Consider 0 < xa ≤ xb. Type a’s
expected payoff from x = xa is
EUa(xa) = [pi(a) + pi(b)]a2 + [pi(c) + pi(d)]a1 − xa
and for any x ∈ [0, xa), type a’s expected payoff is
EUa(x) = [pi(a) + pi(b)]a2 + [pi(c) + pi(d)]a1 − x
< EUa(xa).
This means that [xa, xa] cannot be an equilibrium support unless xa = 0 or 0 ≤ xb < xa.
If 0 < xb ≤ xa, type b’s expected payoff from x = xb is
EUb(xb) = (b1 − xb)[pi(c) + pi(d)].
That is, at the lower bound of type b’s equilibrium support, a firm of type b does not get matched to
a worker unless the other firm is type c or type d. But in those cases, the salary does not affect the
outcome, so that choosing a salary of xb > 0 is strictly dominated by x = 0. Thus, [xb, xb] cannot
be an equilibrium support unless xb = 0 or 0 ≤ xa < xb. Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have
either xa = 0 or xb = 0.
Lemma 2.3.2. In equilibrium, there are no gaps between the equilibrium supports for types with a
common most preferred worker.
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Proof 2. Suppose xa < xb. Then ∀x ∈ (xa, xb), type b’s expected payoff is
EUb(x) = (b1 − x)(1− pi(b))
> (b1 − xb)(1− pi(b)) = EUb(xb),
contradicting the inclusion of xb in the equilibrium support for type b. The proof is similar for the
case when xb < xa. Since the supports are intervals by assumption, there are no other cases to be
considered.
These two lemmas imply that equilibria must be consistent with one of four cases. In each case,
type a mixes over [xa, xa], and type b mixes over [xb, xb], where
Case 1. 0 = xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Case 2. 0 = xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Case 3. [xa, xa] ⊂ [xb, xb], and xb = 0
Case 4. [xb, xb] ⊂ [xa, xa], and xa = 0.
Proposition 2.3.3 generalizes and formalizes the separation result illustrated in Example 2.2.6,
by showing that there cannot be equilibria of the form described by Case 3 or Case 4.
Proposition 2.3.3. Equilibrium supports do not overlap for types with a common most preferred
worker. In particular then, all equilibria must be of the form in Case 1 with xb = xa or Case 2 with
xa = xb.
Proof 3. See Appendix.
The proof for Proposition 2.3.3 is based on demonstrating that indifference cannot be satisfied
simultaneously for both types on an interval with nonempty interior. As a result, the equilibrium
supports in Case 1 and Case 2 must meet at their boundaries. For Case 3 and Case 4, the same
argument implies that a support which is a subset of the other must be a single point. Since best
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responses in pure strategies have already been ruled out, there must not exist an equilibrium in
which one support is nested in the other.
The second result characterizes all symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in which strategies are
continuous with interval support. Moreover, it provides the set of conditions that determine, for
each pair of types with a common most preferred worker, whether their equilibrium supports are
consistent with Case 1 or Case 2. The condition depends on the relative marginal benefits of getting
the types’ common most preferred worker, and on the probability that a firm is the type that also
finds the other worker acceptable.
Proposition 2.3.4. (i) If b1 > pi(a)(a1 − a2), then in all equilibria,
G∗a(x) =
x
pi(a)(a1 − a2)
on the support
[
0, pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
G∗b(x) =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)(b1 − x) [x− pi(a)(a1 − a2)]
on the support
[
pi(a)(a1 − a2), pi(b)b1 + (1− pi(b))pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
,
regardless of G∗c , G
∗
d. The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 > pi(c)(c2 − c1).
(ii) If b1 < pi(a)(a1 − a2), then in all equilibria,
G∗b(x) =
x(pi(c) + pi(d))
pi(b)(b1 − x)
on the support
[
0,
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a)
]
G∗a(x) =
(1− pi(a))x− pi(b)b1
pi(a)(1− pi(a))(a1 − a2)
on the support
[
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a) ,
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a) + pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
.
The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 < pi(c)(c2 − c1).
Proof 4. See Appendix.
Part of the condition in Proposition 2.3.4 has a simple intuition. If type b gets a higher value
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from worker w1 than the marginal value for type a from getting w1 instead of w2, then type b will
be willing to pay more than type a for w1. The role of pi(a) in the condition is less obvious. Keeping
the values fixed, if pi(a) is relatively low, a type a firm does not need to mix over a large interval
to compete against its own type. As a result, if type a firms offer salaries above those offered by
type b, there may be an incentive for type b firms to offer salaries higher than the type a firms in
order to ‘steal’ worker w1 in the event that the other firm is type a. Any such deviation by type b
firms would give type a firms an incentive to lower the support of their distributional strategies to
the lower bound of 0.
Proposition 2.3.4 also leads to two corollaries. First, all things being equal, the more likely a firm
is to face another firm of the same type, the stronger the competitive pressure and the higher the
average equilibrium salary offered by that type. Similarly, the more likely a firm is to face another
firm with the same most preferred worker, the stronger the competition and the higher the average
equilibrium salary offered by the two relevant types.
Corollary 2.3.5. The higher the probability a firm type has to compete against its own type, the
higher (on average) the equilibrium salary offered by that firm type.
Corollary 2.3.6. For any firm, the higher the probability that the other firm has the same most
preferred worker, the higher the equilibrium salary (on average) offered by the firm.
2.4 Competition in Large Markets
This section examines equilibrium behavior in large markets. For tractability, I replicate the two-
firm, two-worker market to obtain a market with 2n firms and 2n workers, consisting of n identical
class w1 workers and n identical class w2 workers. I characterize the equilibria for the case in
which there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, then prove existence, for finite
replicated markets, of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with
interval supports. Moreover, both Proposition 2.3.3 and Proposition 2.3.4 generalize to replicated
markets.
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2.4.1 Market Replication
Using replicated markets avoids the problem of having an exponentially growing type space. Repli-
cation provides a convenient way to conduct a tractable analysis of competitive behavior in large
markets. Furthermore, it removes that chance of realizing an uninteresting market with sparse
competition, in which every firm desires a different type of worker.
The baseline market is the two-firm, two-worker market, with F 1 = {f1, f2} and W = {w1, w2}.
In an n-replicated market, there are 2n firms, Fn = {f1, ..., f2n}, along with n copies of w1, W1 =
{w11, w21, ..., wn1 }, and n copies of w2, W2 = {w12, ..., wn2 }. Since wj1 and wk1 are identical copies of one
another, we assume that all firms are indifferent between any two workers in W1. Likewise, all firms
are indifferent between any two workers in W2. As a result, firms’ preferences (and from these, their
types) are defined as strict orderings over the set {W1,W2, ∅}.
As in Section 2.2, firm types that prefer being unmatched over every worker are ignored.6 This
leaves four possible firm types that are essentially the same as the types in the two-firm, two-worker
model, except that the preferences are over classes of workers W1 and W2.
Pa : W1W2 ∅ Pb : W1 ∅W2
Pc : W2W1 ∅ Pd : W2 ∅W1.
Assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values - one for each worker class, W1
and W2 - while the value of remaining unmatched is normalized to 0. So, for each type k ∈ {a, b, c, d},
k = (k1, k2), where ki is the value of each worker w in the class Wi. For the values to represent the
6We may just as well assume that they don’t enter the market in the first place.
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corresponding preference rankings, they must satisfy
a1 > a2 > 0
b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0
d2 > 0 > d1 .
Each firm knows only its own type, and the types are drawn independently according to the common
prior distribution pi over {a, b, c, d}. That is, pi(k) is the probability that a given firm is a type k
firm, or equivalently, has preferences Pk.
2.4.2 Equilibria in the Continuum Case
Before analyzing the equilibria for a finite replicated market, consider the equilibrium behavior in
the limit, when there is a continuum of firms, and continuum of workers. Moreover, suppose that the
measure of workers in each class W1 and W2 is half the total measure of W . In this environment, since
there are infinitely many firms, the aggregate uncertainty about the realized firm types disappears
from the market. That is, pi(k) is the actual proportion, or the measure of type k firms in the market.
This is a convenient feature because it makes the equilibrium strategies relatively straightforward
functions of the distribution pi.
As for the two-firm, two-worker case, the equilibrium strategy for a given type k does not de-
pend on the strategies of the two types k′, k′′ that have a different most preferred worker class than
type k. Thus, as in Section 2.2, when deriving equilibrium strategies, types a and b can be treated
independently from types c and d. Thus, without loss of generality, consider types a and b. The
analysis is symmetric for types c and d. Proposition 2.4.1 characterizes the equilibria for the limit
case. It is broken into two cases based on the relative marginal values of worker class W1 compared
with worker class W2, for types a and b.
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Proposition 2.4.1. The following two cases characterize the equilibria when there are a continuum
of firms and a continuum of workers, with two equally large worker classes.
(1) b1 ≥ a1 − a2
(i) If pi(a) + pi(b) ≤ 12 , then x∗a = 0 and x∗b = 0.
(ii) If pi(a) > 12 , then x
∗
b = a1 − a2 and
x∗a =

0 with probability pa(0) =
2(pi(a)+pi(b))−1
2pi(a)
a1 − a2 with probability 1− pa(0)
.
(iii) If pi(b) > 12 , then x
∗
a = 0 and x
∗
b = b1.
(iv) If pi(a) ≤ 12 , pi(b) ≤ 12 , but pi(a) + pi(b) > 12 , then x∗b = a1 − a2 and
x∗a =

0 with probability pa(0) =
2(pi(a)+pi(b))−1
2pi(a)
a1 − a2 with probability 1− pa(0)
.
(2) b1 < a1 − a2
(i) If pi(a) + pi(b) ≤ 12 , then x∗a = 0 and x∗b = 0.
(ii) If pi(a) > 12 , then x
∗
b ∈ [0, b1] and
x∗a =

0 with probability qa(0) =
2pi(a)−1
2pi(a)
a1 − a2 with probability 1− qa(0)
.
(iii) If pi(b) > 12 , then x
∗
a = b1 and x
∗
b = b1.
(iv) If pi(a) ≤ 12 , pi(b) ≤ 12 , but pi(a) + pi(b) > 12 , then x∗a = b1 and x∗b = b1.
The proof, which is quite straightforward, is omitted. Instead, Figures 2.1a and 2.1b provide
graphical illustrations of the two cases in Proposition 2.4.1. Each figure plots pi(a) against pi(b) and
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divides the space of probability pairs (pi(b), pi(a)) into segments for each subcase of the equilibrium
characterization. In both Figure 2.1a and Figure 2.1b, the bottom-left triangle corresponds to the
case in which there is an excess supply of class W1 workers, and therefore no competition between
types a and b. Thus, x∗a = x
∗
b = 0 for both cases when pi(a) + pi(b) ≤ 12 .
Figure 2.1a merges the subcase in which pi(a) > 12 with the subcase in which pi(a) ≤ 12 and
pi(b) ≤ 12 , but pi(a) + pi(b) > 12 , since in each, type a firms mix between 0 and a1 − a2 with
probability pa(0) =
2[pi(a)+pi(b)]−1
2pi(a) , while type b firms choose a1 − a2. Finally, in the case when
pi(b) > 12 , type b firms compete with each other and push the salary up to their marginal value from
a class W1 worker, while type a firms know that they will not be matched with a class W1 worker
and so choose a salary of 0.
(a) Case (1): b1 ≥ a1 − a2 (b) Case (2): b1 < a1 − a2
Figure 2.1: Continuum equilibria for firm types a and b in Cases (1) and (2) from Proposition 2.4.1
In Figure 2.1b, we can likewise merge the subcase in which pi(b) > 12 with the subcase in which
pi(a) ≤ 12 and pi(b) ≤ 12 , but pi(a) + pi(b) > 12 , since in each subcase, both type a firms and type b
firms choose a salary of b1. When pi(a) >
1
2 , type a firms mix between 0 and a1−a2 with probability
qa(0) =
2pi(a)−1
2pi(a) , while type b firms choose a salary in the interval [0, b1]. This is because type a firms
drive the salary for a class W1 worker up to a1 − a2 > b1, so that type b firms are never matched
with anyone. Since some of the type a firms will miss out on a class W1 worker, they mix between
the salary a1 − a2 and 0.
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2.4.3 Finite Replicated Markets
As in both the two-firm, two-worker and the continuum cases, the equilibrium depends on the
parameters of the model. We can break up the proof of existence into several cases. The proof is by
construction. We consider firm types a and b, although things are symmetric for types c and d.
Proposition 2.4.2. Given any finite replicated market with 2n firms, n workers in class W1 and
n workers in class W2, there exists an equilibrium (G
∗
a(·), G∗b(·), G∗c(·), G∗d(·)) such that G∗k(·) is a
continuous distribution with interval support in the salary space, for all k = a, b, c, d. The equilibrium
supports for types a and b satisfy
0 = xa < xa = xb < xb
or 0 = xb < xb = xa < xa.
The analogous result holds for the equilibrium supports of types c and d.
Proof 5. See Appendix.
2.5 Convergence of Finite Market Equilibria
This section shows numerically that the replicated market equilibrium strategies converge to the
corresponding continuum equilibrium as the number of replications goes to infinity. The convergence
is illustrated by simulating replicated markets for the market presented in Example 2.2.6. Recall
that a = (2, 1), b = (2,−1), c = (1, 2), and d = (−1, 2), while pi(a) = 12 , pi(b) = 18 , pi(c) = 14 , and
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pi(d) = 18 . The corresponding continuum equilibrium is as follows,
x∗a =

0 with probability 14
1 with probability 34
(2.1)
x∗b = 1 (2.2)
x∗c = 0 (2.3)
x∗d = 0. (2.4)
The equilibrium distribution for a type a firm in an n-replicated market satisfies
xa = 0
xa = (a1 − a2)
[ n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(b)− pi(a)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
]
and for all x ∈ [xa, xa],
x = (a1 − a2)
n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
[
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(a)− pi(b)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
×
n−j−1∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(x)
k−t[1−G∗a(x)]t
]
.
The last equation can be solved, given any value of G∗a(x), for the corresponding value of x. The
pairs (x,G∗a(x)) that satisfy the indifference equations for a given value of n can be used to trace out
the equilibrium distribution for a type a firm in a market that has been replicated n times. Figure
2.2a plots these pairs (x,G∗a(x)) with x on the horizontal axis and G
∗
a(x) on the vertical axis for
several different values of n.
For smaller sized markets, n ∈ {2, 3, 6, 10, 20}, increasing the market size shifts more density
to higher salaries and expands the equilibrium support. However, after n grows large enough,
the equilibrium support approaches its upper bound of 1 (equal to a1 − a2). Then for any larger
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replicated markets, type a firms shift greater weight towards salaries very close to the upper bound.
However, in order to maintain indifference over the support, they also assign greater probability to
very low salaries (close to 0), which leads to a CDF that approaches the continuum equilibrium as
n approaches infinity.
The same procedure can be run for Type b firms, and also for Types c and d. For type b firms,
the corresponding equilibrium support has a lower bound equal to the upper bound of the support
for type a firms, by the separation result. The size of the support for a type b firm’s equilibrium
strategy is decreasing with the size of the market, and since the lower bound for sufficiently large
n is equal to 1, the equilibrium strategies converge towards the continuum equilibrium strategy,
which places the entire mass on a salary equal to 1. Figure 2.3 shows the simulated calculations
for equilibrium strategies of a type b firm in different sized markets. Of particular interest is the
observation that by n = 6, there is already almost no competitive pressure for a type b firm to
compete against another type b firm. Even with so few replications, a type b firm realizes that the
chances of there being more than 5 other type b firms (among the other 11 firms) is very low. As
a result, type b firms choose a salary just high enough to ensure that they will be ranked higher by
the workers than any type a firms.
For types c and d, as the market is replicated, firms perceive that the chances of excess demand
for W2 class workers are very low. It is very easy to show that the equilibrium distributions shift
towards the corresponding continuum equilibrium strategies, which place the entire mass on a salary
of 0. In this respect, as the market is replicated, competitive pressures are enhanced only for the
most popular worker class. However, even then, there is no pressure to compete applied to firms of
the type that has a higher relative marginal value for the popular workers.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents three main results. First, the equilibrium characterization for the two-firm,
two-worker model shows that strategy supports for types with a common most preferred worker are
adjacent, such that the type with a higher relative marginal value for the preferred worker pays a
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premium to ensure it is preferred over any firm of the other type. Second, in the limit, when there
are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, there is no aggregate uncertainty about the
realization of firm types. As a result, competition is confined to the class of workers that are more
popular, while the salaries of other workers fall to zero. Third, when the two-firm, two-worker model
is replicated to form larger markets, there exist distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies
that exhibit the same separation result in the equilibrium supports for types with a common most
preferred worker class. Numerical results suggest that, as the number of replications increases,
the equilibrium strategies in the finite replicated market approach the corresponding continuum
equilibrium strategies. As a result, when markets become larger, aggregate uncertainty about the
actual types of other firms dissipates and reduces the level of competitive pressure on salaries.
A natural extension of this paper is to consider a general n-firm, n-worker model. In this paper,
large markets are generated by replicating the two-firm, two-worker model, which controls the size of
the type space and keeps the analysis tractable. A limitation of this approach is that all workers in
the same class are treated as identical from the perspective of the firms. Future work might focus on
relaxing this assumption, while maintaining tractability. An alternative approach may be to relax
the restriction that firms with the same preference ordering must have the same valuation or utility
representation for that ordering. For instance, suppose each firm’s type is a pair of values θ = (x, y),
each drawn independently from some interval [θ, θ] according to a given distribution.
Both the two-firm, two-worker model, or a small n × n model with just two worker classes, are
simple and interesting candidates for experimental work. Although in theory firms have a dominant
strategy to make offers in order of preference, experimental work will reveal the actual sequence of
offers chosen by the subject firms. Experimental data might provide some indication of the strategies
firms actually play when their types are private information.
Finally, it may prove useful to examine how the theoretical results in this paper fit with empirical
observations in different labor markets. In many labor markets, salaries do not accurately reflect
differences in productivity. Instead, salaries tend to exhibit less variation than worker productivities.
Although the model in this paper does not include explicit levels of productivity, a modified version
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may provide some explanation for this empirical trend in workers’ salaries.
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(a) Type a firms’ equilibrium strategies for n ∈ {2, 3, 6, 10, 20, 100, 200}
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(b) Magnified view of the salary space for x ∈ [0, 0.2]
Figure 2.2: Replicated market equilibria for type a. In panel (a), each curve shows the equilibrium
CDF (cumulative distribution function) for a type a firm, for a given market size. Panel (b) shows a
magnified view of the CDFs at low salaries to illustrate how the density decreases with n in relatively
small markets, then increases with n for sufficiently large markets.
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Figure 2.3: Replicated market equilibria for type b
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Chapter 3
Information and Cooperation in a
Network Public Goods Experiment
3.1 Introduction
There are many different settings in which public goods are provided using the voluntary con-
tributions mechanism. Examples include fundraising by local district school boards, charitable
contributions, or political campaign funds. There is a vast body of theoretical and experimental
literature focused on explaining why individuals contribute in these environments, despite incentives
to free-ride. Much of this literature studies the finitely repeated setting in which players are given
endowments of a private good, which they may contribute towards the production of a linear public
good. In some environments, individuals are active members in several different communities, and
their decisions or actions affect outcomes for multiple neighborhoods. These types of environments
have motivated recent research into public goods on networks, beginning with theoretical work by
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007).
Experimental evidence suggests a robust pattern of contributions in standard repeated public
goods games. Average contributions in the first period are typically around half of the endowment,
then decline steadily over time, although they do not generally converge to zero. This pattern is well
documented in the literature, beginning with Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) and Isaac, McCue,
and Plott (1985). A second key finding in the experimental literature is that many participants
are conditional cooperators whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with
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the contributions (or their beliefs about the contributions) made by others. Chaudhuri (2011)
provides an excellent recent summary of the literature that aims to identify and explain conditional
cooperation.1
The study of conditional cooperation raises two important questions, which provide the motiva-
tion for this paper. First, how does conditional cooperation depend on the nature of the information
players observe about others between rounds of the repeated game? It seems natural to expect that
this feature of the environment will affect both how, and on what the players condition their contri-
bution decisions. Moreover, this type of information can vary significantly in public good settings.
For instance, school district boards tend to publish aggregated statistics about contributions, broken
down by class, neighborhood, or level of contribution. In other cases, participants may be able to
observe the individual contributions made by others.
Second, how does conditional cooperation depend on the structure of interaction between players?
In particular, if players are connected in a network, how do their positions affect contributions?
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) cite several classic examples of goods that are nonexcludable along
social or geographical links, including innovation, or pollution abatement. In these types of environ-
ments, information about participants with whom the subject is not connected may nevertheless be
relevant to the way he chooses to behave. For instance, a conditional cooperator may find it relevant
how much his neighbors’ neighbors contributed toward the public good.
We investigate these two questions using a series of experiments, in which the subjects play a
finitely repeated linear public goods game on a circle network. Each player’s consumption of the
public good depends only on his own contribution, and on those of his neighbors in the network.
The information players are shown between rounds is controlled in two ways. The first exploits the
network structure of the environment, by varying whether subjects observe information about the
whole population or only about their neighborhood. We call this aspect of the design the treatment
group. The second variation changes the type of information statistic shown to subjects about
the relevant treatment group. Specifically, we vary the statistic between average contribution, and
1Some of the main contributions to the literature include Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001); Fischbacher and
Gachter (2010); Croson, Fatas, and Neugebauer (2005); Croson (2007); Frey and Meier (2004); Keser and van Winden
(2000).
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average payoff, for the given treatment group.2
We propose a behavioral model that extends the approach used by Arifovic and Ledyard (2009)
to study contributions in a standard, complete network, repeated public goods game. They combine
their Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) model with a relatively simple model of outcome-based
other-regarding preferences (ORP). The model assumes that players have preferences which reflect
altruism and envy, in the form of a concern for fairness with respect to one’s self. We allow for
heterogeneity across players through their types, which consist of a pair of parameters representing
the player’s degrees of altruism and envy. Each player assesses his utility on the basis of a particular
reference statistic, with respect to a specific reference group of other players. For example, players
may derive utility from an increase in the average payoff earned by their reference group. On the
other hand, they may derive disutility if their own payoff is less than the average payoff in their
reference group, due to envy. This model is most similar to the class of outcome-based ORP models,
which includes the models developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and
Charness and Rabin (2002).
Our approach to preferences is fairly standard among models of other-regarding behavior. How-
ever, there are several novel features that we incorporate in order to extend upon the standard
approach. First, we allow explicitly for variation in a player’s reference group. This is an integral
component of other-regarding preferences that is typically underemphasized by assuming that the
reference group is ‘everyone else’.
Second, we consider two different possible criteria or statistics that players may use to make the
social comparisons that inform their other-regarding preferences. Specifically, when reference groups
are only a subset of the entire population, whether the players care about others’ contributions or
others’ payoffs may lead to different behavior. For a fixed reference group, a player concerned with
payoffs cares about the contributions made by the members of his reference group (his neighbors), but
also the contributions made by his neighbors’ neighbors, some of who may be outside his reference
group. To this point, our approach is grounded in standard other-regarding preferences, albeit with
2In the circle network, these statistics are not informationally equivalent for the neighborhood treatment groups,
since the average payoff conveys some additional information about the contributions made by a player’s neighbors’
neighbors.
37
a sharper focus on reference groups and statistics.
The less standard part of our approach is the claim that in the laboratory setting, we can control
these two important features of the players’ other-regarding preferences. Subjects may enter the
lab with an underlying preference for altruism and fairness, but are less likely to show up with a
predetermined reference group or reference statistic on which to condition their decisions. Since
these reference-based features depend critically on the information made available to the subjects,
we argue that we can manipulate players’ reference groups and statistics, and perhaps then their
decisions, by changing the information provided to them in the experiment.
An alternative, related approach to outcome-based other-regarding preferences argues that in-
dividuals reciprocate the behavior of others, cooperating with those who cooperate and not with
those who don’t. An important component of the theory of reciprocity is the idea that intentions,
not just outcomes, matter for fairness, so that both kindness and unkindness are reciprocated. This
approach is followed and developed by Rabin (1993); Levine (1998); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004); Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Ambrus and Pathak (2011). In recent years, this research
has shown that incorporating intentions can help to explain features of conditionally cooperative
behavior that are unaccounted for by outcome-based models. However, the experimental literature
also suggests that intentions alone are insufficient to explain the scope of conditional cooperation.
In this paper, we focus on a simpler, outcome-based model, which captures the essential features of
conditional cooperation. Reciprocity models like those developed in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) are equilibrium-based models that involve either a great
deal of common knowledge about other players’ preferences, or a well-defined set of ex-ante beliefs
about every possible path of play in the finitely repeated game. Our simpler approach requires no
such assumptions.
The primary innovation of the model is the assumed link between information treatment and
behavior. Specifically, we assume that a player’s reference group is precisely the treatment group
about whom he is shown information, and that his reference statistic is precisely the information
statistic that he is shown about the relevant treatment group between rounds. Thus, when the
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information treatment shows players the average payoff in their neighborhood, each player assesses
outcomes with respect to the average payoff in his neighborhood. If they are instead shown the
average contribution in the whole population, they assess utility with respect to the average con-
tribution in the population. In this way, changing the information treatment changes the utility
function employed by the players, by making certain outcomes and comparisons more salient.
The other important feature of the model is the learning hypothesis. We argue that players are
boundedly rational agents who learn to play the game over time. Following Arifovic and Ledyard
(2009), we use the model of Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) to represent the learning pro-
cess. While there are several other widely studied learning models, such as Reinforcement Learning
or Experience-Weighted Attraction, IEL is particularly well-suited to repeated games with large,
continuous action spaces, like the ones considered in this paper.3 The IEL model is reactive and
individual-based, which allows us to avoid making restrictive assumptions about common knowledge
or beliefs, and it has already been used successfully by Arifovic and Ledyard (2009) to explain a
number of stylized facts from existing experimental data in linear public goods games. We use both
the modified model of other-regarding preferences, which depend on the information treatment, and
the IEL model, altered to incorporate the network structure of the game, to simulate the learning
behavior of the subjects in the series of network public goods experiments.
While we focus on the learning hypothesis, there is another widely adopted approach to explaining
the dynamics of average contributions in repeated games. The strategic approach contends that
the decay in average contributions can be explained as strategic equilibrium behavior in which
selfish players cooperate early in the game, in order to stimulate contributions from conditionally
cooperative players. Although this approach is theoretically quite appealing, it requires a great
deal of common knowledge about all players’ preferences, beliefs, and information. While these
assumptions may be appropriate in simple games like a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, they are difficult
to justify in a repeated public goods game with many periods and a continuous action space, let
alone in such a game where outcomes and contributions are not always perfectly observed. Thus,
3For details of other learning models, see Roth and Erev (1995) for Reinforcement Learning, and Camerer and Ho
(1999) for Experience-Weighted Attraction.
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we adopt the learning hypothesis, in conjunction with a theory of other-regarding preferences, to
model individual behavior in the finitely repeated linear public goods experiments.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, we confirm a considerable amount of
heterogeneity in contribution decisions across individuals. Some subjects contribute everything, some
contribute nothing, while others contribute increasing or decreasing amounts between zero and full
contribution. A significant proportion of subjects always contribute their entire endowment, which
suggests that unconditional giving is a behavioral strategy that should be acknowledged. Many
existing studies ignore or else fail to explain this presence of unconditional giving. For instance, Fis-
chbacher and Gachter (2010) and Ambrus and Pathak (2011) focus only on free-rider and conditional
cooperator types. We use the decisions in the experiments and a simple set of criteria to classify each
subject in a given experimental match as either a free-rider, who always contributes zero; altruist,
who contributes everything, unconditionally; or conditional cooperator, whose contribution depends
on the contributions of others.
Second, we find that more than half of the subjects switch between these behavioral classifica-
tions across games with different information treatments. This switching behavior is consistent with
our modification to the other-regarding preferences model, which links social comparisons to the
outcomes and reference groups that are made salient by the information treatment. Overall, ap-
proximately 70% of the subjects who participated in the experiments behave in a manner consistent
with the modified other-regarding preferences model.
Third, we show that learning is an important channel through which information and interaction
structure affect contributions. After classifying the subjects as free-riders, altruists, or conditional
cooperators, we compute the complete information Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. This
equilibrium provides a benchmark which we might expect players to converge to with repetition in
the experiment, as they learn how to play the game. In fact, we find that in most cases, subjects’
contributions do not converge to the corresponding Nash equilibrium. However, they are remark-
ably consistent with simulated behavior generated by the combined ORP-IEL model. By their
classification, the free-riders and altruists converge almost immediately (or very quickly) to their
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Nash equilibrium (and dominant strategy) contributions of zero and the endowment, respectively.
The stability of their contribution decisions provides an anchor that accelerates learning by their
neighbors in the network. As a result, conditional cooperators who are connected to free-riders or
altruists learn faster than those who are not, and the degree of learning spreads contagiously around
the circle network. This differential learning between free-riders/altruists and conditional coopera-
tors, and the learning contagion effects are both observed in the experimental data and reproduced
in the simulation data.
In the next section, we introduce the game and outline the behavioral model. Section 3.3 describes
the experimental procedures and design. In Section 3.4, we derive the benchmark Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game and show that players may switch between behavioral strategies across games
with different information treatments. In Section 3.5, we present the main findings from the data,
and in Section 3.6, we present the learning results. Section 3.7 concludes and discusses avenues for
further research.
3.2 The Network Public Goods Game
Let I = {1, ..., n} be the set of players, each with an endowment ωi = 1. The players must each
choose how much of their endowment to consume privately, and how much to contribute towards
the public good. Player i’s contribution to the public good is yi ∈ [0, 1] and y = (yi)i∈I is the profile
of contributions made by all players.
The players are connected through a network, which is defined by an n × n matrix G, where
G(i, j) = 1 if and only if player i is directly connected to player j. We assume G(i, i) = 0 for all
i ∈ I. We use Ni(G) to denote the set of direct neighbors for player i in the network G. Formally,
Ni(G) = {j ∈ I |G(i, j) = 1}. (3.1)
Let ki(G) = |Ni(G)| be player i’s degree.
The level of public good enjoyed by player i depends on his own contribution, the contributions
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made by his neighbors, and the marginal return to contributions, A, and is given by
Y i(G,y) = A ·
[
yi +
∑
j∈Ni(G)
yj
]
. (3.2)
Player i’s payoff is
pii(G,y) = 1− yi + Y i(G,y). (3.3)
We consider A ∈ (0.5, 1) since it gives rise to a classical social dilemma. Within this range, an
individual looking to maximize payoffs has a dominant strategy to free-ride, while the total welfare
of all players is maximized by everyone contributing their entire endowment.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiments were run in the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at the California
Institute of Technology in August and September 2011. There were a total of 72 participants over
6 sessions. Each session lasted for approximately 1 hour and subjects earned an average payout of
US$25. Earnings in the experiment were denominated in tokens and converted into US dollars at the
end of the experiment (500 tokens = US$1). At the start of the experiment, the instructions were
distributed and then read aloud, with summary slides projected at the front of the room. At the end
of the instructions, the subjects participated in an unpaid 3-period practice match and answered
four questions about the experiment and the way earnings were calculated.
There were 12 subjects in each session. A session was composed of 4 matches. At the start of
each match, the 12 subjects were randomly divided into two groups of six players. In each group,
the players were assigned to a position on the circle network shown in Figure 3.1 and then played
15 rounds of the voluntary contributions game described in Section 3.2.
In every round of a match, each subject received 100 tokens. During the round, we asked them
how many tokens they wished to contribute towards some project and informed them that whatever
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Figure 3.1: The circle network with 6 agents. As an example, the neighborhood for player 1 includes
himself and his two neighbors, player 2 and player 6.
tokens they did not contribute, they could keep for themselves. We used a partners treatment, so
that subjects stayed in the same group and at the same position in the network through every round
of a given match. In four of the sessions, the 12 subjects were randomly rematched and repositioned
before each match. In the other two sessions, subjects were randomly rematched and repositioned
before match 1 and match 3 only. Their groups and positions were unchanged from match 1 to
match 2 and from match 3 to match 4.
We calculated player payoffs as follows. First, we added the player’s contribution to the sum of
the contributions made by her direct neighbors. Then we multiplied the total by a return factor A
(equal to 0.6 in all six experiments), and added this amount to the tokens that were kept by the
player. That is, for player i, the payoff pii in a particular round was given by
pii = 100− i’s contribution +A · ( i’s contribution +
∑
i’s neighbors’ contributions ).
In every round of a match, the player’s location, her direct neighbors, and the return factor A were
kept fixed. Moreover, the payoffs in one round did not depend on decisions made in previous rounds.
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3.3.1 Information Treatments
After each round, the subjects were given the following summary information. In all matches, we
showed them the amount they contributed to the project, the total contributions made in their
neighborhood, and their payoff from the round. In addition, we reported one of the following
information treatments.
(i) The average payoff received by you and your direct neighbors.
(ii) The average payoff received by all six players in your group.
(iii) The average contribution made by you and your direct neighbors.
(iv) The average contribution made by all six players in your group.
In a given match, all players faced the same information treatment, and we used the same information
treatment in every round of a match. After the last player made his or her contribution decision,
we displayed the round summary screen with all the information for approximately 8 to 10 seconds,
after which the next round began. All reported information from previous rounds was displayed in
a history panel at the bottom of the screen.4 We ran the two groups simultaneously for each match
so that subjects did not know which 5 out of the other 11 subjects they were matched with, let alone
which two were their direct neighbors.
3.4 The Behavioral Model
In this section, we introduce the behavioral model, which combines a modified model of other-
regarding preferences with the IEL model of Arifovic and Ledyard (2009).
3.4.1 Other-Regarding Preferences
The preferences in the model are an extension of the specification used by Arifovic and Ledyard
(2009). Their model is consistent with the outcome-based or distributional models of Fehr & Schmidt
4Screenshots are provided in the Appendix along with the experiment instructions.
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(1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000). Each player evaluates outcomes with respect to a reference
group of others, according to two underlying motivations. First, the player is altruistic, in that he
cares about the well-being of the players in his reference group. Second, the player is concerned
about fairness, in the sense that he dislikes outcomes in which he does not do as well as the others in
his reference group. In Arifovic and Ledyard (2009), the reference group is just the set of all players
in the game. Our innovation introduces two channels that link preferences to the information a
player observes about others’ decisions. The first channel is the player’s reference group, which is
induced by the treatment group, and the second is the information statistic, which he uses to evaluate
outcomes.
Let Ri be player i’s reference group, and assume that i ∈ Ri and |Ri| ≥ 2 for all i ∈ I. We
consider two possible reference groups in this paper,
(1) the player’s neighborhood, Ri = Ni(G) ∪ {i}, and
(2) the whole set of players, Ri = I.
Let Si be the reference statistic used by player i to evaluate outcomes. In this paper, we consider
the case in which players evaluate outcomes using either
(1) average contribution in their reference group, Si =
∑
j∈Ri
yj
|Ri| , or
(2) average payoff in their reference group, Si =
∑
j∈Ri
pij
|Ri| .
Each player has an underlying type, which consists of an altruism parameter, βi ≥ 0 and an envy
parameter, γi ≥ 0. We assume this underlying type is stable and independent of both the reference
group and reference point. Thus, we can write player i’s utility function as
Ui(G,y) = pii(G,y) + β
i · Si − γi ·max
{
0 , ∆Si
}
, (3.4)
where ∆Si takes one of two forms. If player i’s reference point is the average contribution in her
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reference group, then
∆Si = yi −
∑
j∈Ri
yj
|Ri| . (3.5)
On the other hand, if player i’s reference point is the average payoff in her reference group, then
∆Si =
∑
j∈Ri
pij
|Ri| − pii. (3.6)
3.4.2 Equilibrium Behavior
Given a set of types, reference groups, and reference statistics, it is relatively straightforward to
solve the (complete information) Nash equilibrium of the game. First, consider the case in which
the reference statistic is average contribution for all players.
Proposition 3.4.1. Suppose {(βi, γi)}i∈I are the players’ preference parameters, {Ri}i∈I are their
reference groups, and Si =
∑
j∈Ri
yj
|Ri| are their reference statistics. Then there exists a Nash equilib-
rium y∗, in which each player i chooses a contribution equal to
(a) y∗i = 0 if β
i ≤ (1−A)|Ri| (3.7)
(b) y∗i =
∑
j∈Ri
y∗j
|Ri| if (1−A)|Ri| < β
i < (1−A+ γi)|Ri| − γi (3.8)
(c) y∗i = 1 if β
i ≥ (1−A+ γi)|Ri| − γi. (3.9)
If there exists some player j who satisfies either of the conditions in (a) or (b), then the equilibrium
is unique. Otherwise, there are a continuum of equilibria in which y∗i = y
∗
j for all players i, j ∈ I.
Proof 6. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.4.1 says that in equilibrium, a player either contributes everything, contributes
nothing, or contributes the average contribution made by the players in her reference group. The
conditions on βi and γi have a natural interpretation. The inequality in (3.7) says that if player
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i’s altruistic parameter, βi is sufficiently low, then his best response to any profile of others’ contri-
butions is to contribute zero. In this case, we refer to him as a free-rider. On the other hand, the
inequality in (3.9) implies that if player i’s altruistic parameter is high enough relative to his fairness
parameter γi, then his best response is always to contribute everything, making him an altruist. For
a player who falls into case (b), for any given profile of others’ contributions, his best response is to
contribute the average amount contributed by the players in his reference group. We refer to such
a player as a conditional cooperator.
Deriving the Nash equilibrium of the game for a given realization of types, and reference groups,
when the reference statistic is average contribution, involves a few simple steps. First, we classify the
altruists and free-riders, whose equilibrium behavior is unconditional. Then we find the equilibrium
contributions of the conditional cooperators by solving a system of linear equalities. As long as
there is at least one free-rider or altruist, there is a unique solution to this system. However, if
all players are conditional cooperators, then the system has a continuum of solutions in which all
players contribute the same amount.
Next, suppose that the reference statistic is average payoff for all players.
Proposition 3.4.2. Suppose {(βi, γi)}i∈I are the players’ preference parameters, {Ri}i∈I are their
reference groups, and Si =
∑
j∈Ri
pij
|Ri| are their reference statistics.. Then there exists an equilibrium
in which player i chooses a contribution equal to
(a) y∗i = 0 if β
i ≤ (1−A)|Ri|
A
(
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|+ 1
)
− 1
(3.10)
(b) y∗i = 1 if β
i ≥ γi + (1−A)(1 + γ
i)|Ri|
A
(
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|+ 1
)
− 1
. (3.11)
If player i does not satisfy either of the conditions in (a) or (b), her best response to a profile of
others’ contributions is to choose the feasible contribution that minimizes the absolute difference
between her own payoff and the average payoff in her reference group.
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Proof 7. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.4.2 provides similar predictions as Proposition 3.4.1. A player who is sufficiently
self-interested will free-ride, while a player who is sufficiently altruistic, relative to his envy, will
give everything. The equilibrium behavior of a conditional cooperator is slightly different, due to
feasibility constraints. While a conditional cooperator would like to equalize his payoff with the
average payoff in his reference group, this will not always be possible, since he cannot contribute
less than zero or more than his endowment. As a result, the solution to the set of simultaneous
inequalities may be on the boundary.
These propositions imply that, even in equilibrium, a player with fixed type parameters βi and
γi, may behave differently when their reference group and reference statistic change. This is because
the critical cutoffs in the type space that define free-riders, altruists, and conditional cooperators
depend on the reference group and reference statistic. Given our assumption that players use the
treatment group as their reference group and the treatment statistic as the reference statistic, our
model predicts variation in behavior as we change the information treatment. The sequence in
Figure 3.2 illustrates how a player with fixed type parameters faces different incentives under the
four alternative treatments used in the experiments.
3.4.3 Learning
While the other-regarding preferences (ORP) are crucial for explaining behavior, they are still not
sufficient to explain the full pattern of contributions in the repeated game. Our full behavioral
model combines the modified ORP model with the IEL theory of learning developed by Arifovic &
Ledyard (2009).
The main features of the IEL model are described by the following. Each player i keeps a finite
set of remembered actions in period t, denoted by Ait ⊂ [0, 100]. Suppose that |Ait| = J for all i
and all t. Furthermore, each player uses a forgone utility function, ui(aij,t|ri(yt)), which specifies
the utility that player i thinks he could have earned by playing alternative aij,t in period t, given the
information ri(yt) that he received at the end of period t. The three stages of the model are
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Figure 3.2: Switching behavior predicted by the modified other-regarding preferences model. The
player “Luke” has fixed type parameters (βi, γi), while the cutoff regions change with the information
treatment.
1. Experimentation. For each player, on each slot j = 1, ..., J of their remembered set, exper-
imentation occurs with probability ρ. If experimentation occurs, then the old alternative in
slot j, aij,t is replaced by a new action, which is randomly selected from [0, 100] according to
a normal distribution with mean aij,t and standard deviation σ.
2. Replication. For each player, and each slot j = 1, ..., J , the alternative filling slot j in period
t + 1 is chosen as follows. Pick two member of Ait randomly with replacement, with uniform
probability. Call these alternatives aik,t and a
i
l,t. Then set
aij,t+1 =

aik,t if u
i(aik,t|ri(xt)) ≥ ui(ail,t|ri(xt))
ail,t if u
i(aik,t|ri(xt)) < ui(ail,t|ri(xt)).
(3.12)
This procedure favors alternatives with a lot of replicates in the remembered set at period t,
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and alternatives that would have paid well in period t, had they been used.
3. Selection. In period t+ 1, alternative aik,t+1 ∈ Ait+1 is selected with probability proportional
to the forgone utility from that alternative, given by
µik,t+1 =
ui(aik,t+1|ri(xt))− εit+1
J∑
j=1
[
ui(aij,t+1|ri(xt))− εit+1
] (3.13)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., N} and all k ∈ {1, ..., J}, where
εit+1 = min
a∈Ait+1
{
0, ui(a|ri(xt))
}
.
We assume that the process is initialized by randomly populating Ai1 with J uniform draws from
[0, 100], and setting µik,1 =
1
J for all slots k. Given the design of our experiments, we assume that
the forgone utility function depends on the information treatment and the network structure. We
consider each treatment separately.
Treatment 1 — Average Payoff in Neighborhood
In this case, the players observe their own contribution, yit, their own payoff, pii and the average
payoff in their neighborhood, which is given by
p¯ii =
pii
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}| +
∑
j∈Ni(G)
pij
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}| .
Furthermore, |Ni(G)∪ {i}| and G are known by each subject. Thus, if player i chooses yit in period
t, her own perceived payoff from choosing ai instead of yit, given what her neighbors did would have
been
pˆii = pii − (ai − yit)(1−A),
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while the average payoff of her reference group (the players in her neighborhood, including herself)
would have been
ˆ¯pii = p¯ii + (a
i − yit)
[ |Ni(G)|
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}|A−
(1−A)
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}|
]
.
From these two counterfactuals, we can write the forgone utility function for player i as
ui(ai|yit, pii, p¯ii) = pii − (1−A)(ai − yit)
+ βi(p¯ii + (a
i − yit)
( |Ni(G)|
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}|A−
(1−A)
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}
)
− γi ·max
{
0, p¯ii − pii + (ai − yit)
|Ni(G)|
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}|
}
.
Notice that the counterfactuals are all assessed under the assumption that other players’ decisions
are kept fixed.
Treatment 2 — Average Payoff in Group
In Treatment 2, subjects observe the average payoff of all the players in their group. Thus, they see
their own contribution yit, their own payoff pii, and the group average payoff given by
p¯i =
pii
n
+
∑
j∈I
pij
n
.
In such a case, the counterfactual own payoff and group average payoff allow us to write the forgone
utility function for player i from choosing a contribution ai instead of yit as
ui(ai|yit, pii, p¯i) = pii − (1−A)(ai − yit) + βi
(
p¯i + (ai − yit)
( |Ni(G)|A− (1−A)
n
))
−γi ·max
{
0, p¯i +
(ai − yit)
(|Ni(G)|A− (N + 1)(1−A))
n
}
.
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Treatment 3 — Average Contribution in Neighborhood
For Treatment 3, subjects observe their own contribution, yit, their own payoff, pii and the average
contribution made in their neighborhood,
y¯i =
∑
j∈Ni(G)∪{i}
yjt
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}| .
Determining the counterfactual own payoff, and the counterfactual average neighborhood contribu-
tion, we can write the forgone utility function for this case as
ui(ai|yit, pii, y¯i) = pii − (1−A)(ai − yit) + βi
(
y¯i +
(ai − yit)
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}|
)
−γi ·max
{
0, ai − y¯i − (a
i − yit)
|Ni(G) ∪ {i}|
}
.
Treatment 4 — Average Contribution in Group
Finally, for Treatment 4, subjects observe own contribution, yit, own payoff, pii and the group average
contribution,
y¯ =
∑
j∈I
yjt
n
.
In this case, the relevant counterfactuals, assuming others’ decisions do not change, generate the
forgone utility function given by
ui(ai|yit, pii, y¯) = pii − (1−A)(ai − yit) + βi
(
y¯ +
(ai − yit)
n
)
−γi ·max
{
0, ai − y¯ − (a
i − yit)
n
}
.
In Section 3.6, we return to the learning model, and describe the simulation procedures and the
learning results. In the next section, we turn instead to the experimental findings.
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3.5 Experimental Findings
We begin by describing the aggregate data, which paints a picture consistent with previous exper-
imental findings. As Figure 3.3 shows, the average contribution exhibits a steady decay from just
over half the endowment in the first round, to about 20% of the endowment in the last round. This
pattern of decay is also consistent in each of the four information treatments.
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Figure 3.3: Average contribution over all matches by round. Treatment 1 = ave. payoff in neigh-
borhood, Treatment 2 = ave. payoff in group, Treatment 3 = ave. contribution in neighborhood,
Treatment 4 = ave. contribution in group
Between treatments, average contributions are slightly higher in Treatments 3 and 4, when
players observe the average contributions of others, than in Treatments 1 and 2, when they observe
the average payoffs of others. This may be a result of more free-riders in the average payoff treatments
than the average contribution treatments, which is consistent with the higher cutoffs for free-riding
predicted by the model. On the other hand, there is little evidence that average contributions differ
depending on whether the subjects are shown information about the whole group or just about their
neighbors. Nevertheless, there is much more variation when we turn to look at the individual match
level data.
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3.5.1 Subject Behavior
In order to analyze the data at the individual match level, I first classify the subjects by their
behavior as a free-rider, altruist, or conditional cooperator. I use a simple set of criteria to classify
the subjects, based on their choices in the penultimate three rounds of the matches. The criteria
are as follows.
Consider the subject’s contribution decisions in Rounds 12, 13, and 14.
(1) If the subject’s contribution is less than 10 in at least 2 of the 3 rounds, she is classified as a
free-rider.
(2) If the subject’s contribution is greater than 90 in at least 2 of the 3 rounds, she is classified as
an altruist.
(3) If the subject’s contribution does not satisfy either of the conditions in (1) or (2), she is
classified as a conditional cooperator.
In the data, subjects’ decisions exhibit all three types of behavior predicted by the modified
other-regarding preferences model. Table 1 summarizes the frequency of each behavior and highlights
the considerable heterogeneity among the subject pool. Furthermore, there are a large variety of
configurations of these classes in the 48 Matches. Table 2 shows the frequency of 6 broad categories
of configurations. Within each of the reported categories there is even more variation regarding, for
instance, the number of free-riders and conditional cooperators, whether free-riders are adjacent or
separated, or whether or not a free-rider and altruist are adjacent.
Table 3.1: Player Behavior Classification
Behavior type Frequency
Free-Rider (F) 74
Altruist (A) 53
Conditional Cooperator (C) 161
Total 288
54
Table 3.2: Configuration of Players: F = Free-rider, A = Altruist, C = Conditional Cooperator
Configuration description Frequency
F & C only 18
A & C only 10
F only 1
A only 2
C only 5
F, A, & C 12
Total 48
In order to check how well my classification fits with the data, I examine the average contribution
made by each class of player in each round. Figure 3.4 shows the average contribution by round
for each class. The figure illustrates two key points. First, the free-riders take time to converge to
free-riding. In contrast, the altruists tend to converge very quickly to full contributions. Second, the
classification procedure provides a fairly robust fit to the decisions of the free-riders and altruists,
even in the earlier rounds which are not used for classification. Out of the 74 free-riders, 15 contribute
0 in every round, and 29 of them have an average contribution (over all rounds) less than 5. Similarly,
out of the 53 altruists, 18 contribute 100 in every round, and 41 of them have an average contribution
(over all rounds) greater than 90. Thus, there are some classified free-riders who contribute nothing
from the beginning, and almost all classified altruists contribute very close to their entire endowment
through every round of the game.
In Figure 3.5, I also show the average contribution for the conditional cooperators, when they
are broken down by the classification of their direct neighbors. For instance, notice that the average
contribution for conditional cooperators with two altruist neighbors is close to full contribution, while
the average contribution for conditional cooperators with two free-rider neighbors is decreasing to
zero (there are only 2 players in this situation). For the other subclasses of conditional cooperators,
the average contributions are all in line with what we should expect. Those with an altruist neighbor
contribute higher (on average) than those with a free-rider neighbor. For the most part, the average
contribution in the subclasses also appears to decline over time.
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Figure 3.4: Average contribution by round for each class
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3.5.1.1 Switching Behavior in the Experiments
In the data there are many subjects who have different classifications in different matches. Using
the criteria described above, there are 37 subjects (51%) who are classified differently in different
matches. Of these 37 subjects, 15 exhibit switching that is perfectly consistent with the restrictions
of the theory. There may be several reasons why the other subjects who switch do not appear to do
so in a manner consistent with the theory. For one thing, subjects may be making mistakes or still
learning about their incentives in the game, particularly in the first or second matches that they play.
However, this is a difficult phenomenon to identify or allow for in the analysis. Alternatively, there
may be some incorrect classification by the simple criteria that I use in this paper.5 All in all, the
analysis in this section suggests that, out of the 72 subjects who participated in these experiments,
50 of them (70%) exhibit revealed behavior that can be explained by the modified other-regarding
preferences model.
Table 3.3: Switching Behavior by Subject
Subject’s Classifications Number of Subjects
Free-Rider (F) in all 4 matches 8
Conditional Cooperator (CC) in all 4 matches 24
Altruist (A) in all 4 matches 3
Either F or C in each match 15
Either C or A in each match 14
Either F or A in each match 2
Each of F, C & A in some match 6
Total 72
3.5.2 Comparison to the Benchmark Nash Equilibrium
In Section 3.4, we derived the conditions for solving for the complete information Nash equilibrium
of the stage game, assuming players have other-regarding preferences. Except for the case when all
six players are conditional cooperators (CCs), there is a unique Nash equilibrium for a given config-
uration of free-riders, altruists, and CCs. Even though subjects do not have complete information
5One way to address this is to try to elicit players’ revealed types from a separate social dilemma type game that
might allow us to parametrize the subjects’ types before they play the repeated public goods games. An approach
similar to the one used by Fischbacher et al. (2001) in which players play submit their contribution decisions via the
strategy method is one alternative.
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in the experiments, a natural hypothesis is that players’ contributions will converge fairly close to
the Nash equilibrium after 10 or 12 rounds of playing with the same group. In fact, we show that
players’ contributions do not always converge to the corresponding Nash equilibrium.
Since each match is unique, with possibly a different configuration of types, we focus on the
absolute differences between the Nash equilibrium contributions, and the 3-period average contri-
bution from rounds 12–14. Panel (a) of Figure 3.6 is a scatterplot of the differences for each player
in all matches. It shows that there are many points scattered far away from zero. The variance is
significantly larger than we need to conclude that contributions converge to the Nash equilibrium.
The mean difference is 14.69, while the standard deviation is 18.48, almost one fifth of the endow-
ment. This picture is also slightly misleading, since any free-rider or altruist types are so classified
based on their contributions in the penultimate three rounds of the game. Thus, including them
in the calculation biases the average difference between Nash equilibrium and the 3-period average
contribution towards zero.
In panel (b) of Figure 3.6, we remove the altruist and free-rider types. In this case, the picture is
even more bleak. The mean absolute difference increases to 26.19, while the standard deviation stays
fairly constant at 18.64. This is hardly overwhelming evidence in support of the hypothesis that
subjects converge to the corresponding Nash equilibrium given the underlying types. Such disparity
between the data and the Nash equilibrium contributions suggests that if conditionally cooperative
subjects are learning how to play the game over time, that learning is incomplete.
From the individual match level data, we find evidence for the following two results.
Result 3.5.1. Conditional cooperators’ contributions come closer to the corresponding Nash equi-
librium contribution when there are more free-riders or altruists in the group.
This first result suggests that the composition of players in the match affects the level of contri-
butions made by conditional cooperators. Below, we argue that this result is driven by differential
learning. Free riders and altruist learn to play their dominant strategies (zero and full contributions,
respectively) relatively fast in the repeated game. The stability of their contributions provides an
anchor which enhances learning by their conditional cooperator neighbors. The more anchors in the
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(a) All player types. 258 observations, mean absolute difference = 14.69,
std. error = 18.48
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(b) Conditional cooperators only. 132 observations, mean absolute differ-
ence = 26.19, std. error = 18.64
Figure 3.6: Absolute difference between 3-period ave. contribution (Rounds 12–14) and the corre-
sponding Nash equilibrium. These figures suggest that contributions do not converge to the Nash
equilibrium, even on average.
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group, the faster the conditional cooperators learn, and the closer they come to playing the Nash
equilibrium by the end of the game.
The second result emphasizes the importance of the players’ relative positions in the network,
given the group’s composition. In particular, players that are positioned next to a free-rider or next
to an altruist tend to come closer to contributing the corresponding Nash equilibrium level.
Result 3.5.2. Individual contributions in a given match tend to be closer to (further from) the
benchmark Nash equilibrium for conditional cooperators who are positioned closer to (further from)
the free-rider or altruists in the group.
The intuition for this result is that, since free-riders and altruists provide an anchor for learning
by their conditional cooperator neighbors, learning spreads contagiously through the network. For
instance, if the group consists of a single free-rider and five conditional cooperators, the conditional
cooperators who are next to the free-rider will learn faster and converge closer to the corresponding
Nash equilibrium of zero contributions. The learning spreads more slowly to their other neighbors,
and slowest to the conditional cooperator who is farthest removed from the free-rider in the network.
There is evidence supporting both of these results across each of the four information treatments.
A full analysis is provided in Appendix B. There, we summarize the evidence from the individual
matches broken down by the information treatment. However, we report several representative cases
in this section, in order to highlight the results. First consider Result 3.5.1. In Figure 3.7, we present
the actual 3-period average contributions in three matches played under Treatment 2, across various
sessions. For each match, the player number is shown on the horizontal axis, with each player next
to his neighbors. Note that the two end players are connected to each other. Where possible, we
have arranged the order to show any free-riders or altruists in the middle.
In each of the three matches in Figure 3.7, the composition of types includes only free-riders and
conditional cooperators, which implies that the benchmark Nash equilibrium for each player is to
contribute zero. Moving from left to right, match 3a includes one free-rider, match 5b includes two
free-riders, and match 2a includes three free-riders. As demonstrated by the figures, the average
contributions made by the conditional cooperator types are declining as we move from the left panel
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(fewer free-riders) to the right panel (more free-riders). The result is also captured under Treatment
4, by matches 5b, 1a, and 4b, which consist of conditional cooperators grouped with two, three, and
four altruists, respectively. In these cases, the corresponding Nash equilibrium contributions are 100
for all subjects. Moving from left to right, Figure 3.8 indicates that the average contribution of the
conditional cooperators is increasing in the number of altruists.
Next, consider Result 3.5.2. First of all, this result is also demonstrated remarkably well by the
matches shown in Figure 3.7. In each of the three matches, contributions are increasing as we move
in either direction, away from the free-riders. The result is also highlighted in Figure 3.9, which
reproduces match 1b under Treatment 1, match 4a under Treatment 2, and matches 1a, 2b, and 3a,
under Treatment 3.
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Figure 3.7: Treatment 2 matches with free-riders and CCs only. Free-riders’ contributions are shown in gray, while the contributions of conditional
cooperators are shown in black.
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Figure 3.8: Treatment 4 matches with altruists and CCs only. Altruists’ contributions are shown in gray, while the contributions of conditional
cooperators are shown in black.
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Figure 3.9: Effect of players’ positions on contributions. Gray bars indicate either a free-rider or altruist. Conditional cooperators are shown in
black.
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3.6 Learning Results
In order to explain Result 3.5.1 and Result 3.5.2, we conduct learning simulations using a com-
bined model of Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) and the modified other-regarding preferences
model. In this section, we describe the simulations and present the learning results. These results
show that the nonconvergence to the benchmark Nash equilibrium levels and the two features of the
data described in Result 3.5.1 and Result 3.5.2 are all consistent with the combined ORP-learning
model.
3.6.1 Simulations
For the simulations, we used the following parameter values to calibrate IEL. The size of the remem-
bered set for each player is set to J = 100 and the probability of experimentation ρ = 0.033. The
new alternative is selected according to a normal distribution, conditional on the set of possible con-
tributions [0, 100] with mean equal to the old alternative and a standard deviation equal to σ = 10.
These are the same values of J , ρ, and σ used by Arifovic & Ledyard (2009), who show that their
results are not sensitive to the precise values of these parameters. Likewise, in our simulations, the
particular values of these parameters do not induce any significant changes in the results.
We ran 250 iterations for each simulation, and a simulation for each individual match in the
dataset, tailored to the classified configuration of players, and the information treatment used for
the match. For each information treatment, the cutoffs that characterize the free-riders and altruists
are slightly different. Thus, in order to ensure that the configuration of players is consistent in the
simulation with the corresponding individual match, we assign the free-riders and altruists preference
parameters that satisfy the appropriate cutoff for the corresponding information treatment. For the
conditional cooperators, each iteration of the simulation draws a new pair of preference parameters
from a range that only permits incentives for conditional cooperation. This ensures that, in each
iteration of each simulation, the actual configuration of players, as classified according to the criteria
discussed above, remains the same.
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3.6.2 Simulation Results
The scatterplots in Figure 3.10 show the absolute differences between the 3-period average contribu-
tion (from Rounds 12–14) in the simulations and the data. Panel (a) shows all players while panel
(b) shows only the conditional cooperators in order to remove the downward bias from classification
of the free-riders and altruists. The absolute differences are, on average, significantly improved over
the differences between the data and the Nash equilibrium. Still, the variance is not particularly
small for either of these cases. Overall, the simulations reduce the mean absolute difference by 26%
from 14.69 to 10.85, using all players, and by 33% from 26.19 to 17.48, using just the conditional
cooperators.
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Figure 3.10: Differences between 3-period ave. contribution: Simulations vs data
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The consistency between the simulations and data is much more evident at the individual match
level. In particular, the learning simulations reproduce the findings summarized by Result 3.5.1 and
Result 3.5.2. Here, we provide a summary which compares the simulation results with the evidence
of the two main results discussed in Section 3.5. In each figure below, the 6 players in a match are
shown together, next to their neighbors on the horizontal axis, with the exception of the players on
the ends who are also connected to each other. On the vertical axis, we plot the simulation average
in blue (behind) and the data average in red (in front). The main features of the data are reproduced
in the learning simulations for a remarkably high percentage of the matches.
First consider Result 3.5.1. In Figure 3.11, we show that the simulations (blue) replicate the
data (red) quite closely. From left to right, match 3a includes one free-rider, match 5b includes two
free-riders, and match 2a includes three free-riders. As in the data, the simulations also suggest that
the average contributions made by the conditional cooperators are declining as we move from the
left panel across to the right panel.
The same is true for matches 5b, 1a, and 4b under Treatment 4, shown in Figure 3.12. In these
matches, which consist of two, three, and four altruists, respectively, both the simulations and the
data show that the average contribution of the conditional cooperators is increasing in the number
of altruists.
Next, consider Result 3.5.2. As discussed in Section 3.5, this result is also supported by the
matches in Figure 3.11. In each of the three matches, both the simulated and actual contributions
get noticeably higher for players as we move away from the free-riders. The simulations are also
consistent with Result 3.5.2 in the matches displayed in Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.11: Treatment 2 matches with free-riders and CCs only. Simulation averages are shown in blue (behind), while the data averages are shown
in red (front).
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Figure 3.12: Treatment 4 matches with altruists and CCs only. Simulation averages are shown in blue (behind), while the data averages are shown
in red (front).
67
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1b‐1  1b‐2  1b‐3  1b‐4  1b‐5  1b‐6 
A
l
t
r
u
i
s
t
 
3
‐
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
3
o
n
 
Player 
Treatment 1 ‐ Match 1b 
Configura3on:   C C A C C C 
(a) Treatment 1 Match 1b
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
4a‐4  4a‐5  4a‐6  4a‐1  4a‐2  4a‐3 
A
l
t
r
u
i
s
t
 
3
‐
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
3
o
n
 
Player 
Treatment 2 ‐ Match 4a 
Configura3on:   C C A C C C 
(b) Treatment 2 Match 4a
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1a‐2  1a‐3  1a‐4  1a‐5  1a‐6  1a‐1 
F
r
e
e
‐
R
i
d
e
r
 
3
‐
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
3
o
n
 
Player 
Treatment 3 ‐ Match 1a 
Configura3on:   C C F C C C 
(c) Treatment 3 Match 1a
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
2b‐1  2b‐2  2b‐3  2b‐4  2b‐5  2b‐6 
F
r
e
e
‐
R
i
d
e
r
 
F
r
e
e
‐
R
i
d
e
r
 
3
‐
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
3
o
n
 
Player 
Treatment 3 ‐ Match 2b 
Configura3on:   C F F C C C 
(d) Treatment 3 Match 2b
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
3a‐5  3a‐6  3a‐1  3a‐2  3a‐3  3a‐4 
F
r
e
e
‐
R
i
d
e
r
 
3
‐
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
3
o
n
 
Player 
Treatment 3 ‐ Match 3a 
Configura3on:   C C F C C C 
(e) Treatment 3 Match 3a
Figure 3.13: Learning contagion. Simulation averages are shown in blue (behind), while the data averages are shown in red (front).
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we find evidence that both the information shown to players between rounds and the
neighborhood structure of interaction affect voluntary contributions to a public good on a network.
Using a series of experiments, we show that contributions are consistent with a model in which
players, who have other-regarding preferences that depend on the information treatment, learn how
to play the game over time. The dependence of preferences on who and what the players observe
after each round helps to explain heterogeneity in behavior, and also captures situations in which
players switch between very different behavioral strategies across different games. In addition, from
an experimental design perspective, these results imply that experimenters can partially control
subjects’ preferences, even in settings where subjects bring their own, unobservable other-regarding
preferences into the lab.
After developing a modified other-regarding preferences model, we use a set of simple criteria
to identify and classify each player in a match as a free-rider, an altruist, or a conditional cooper-
ator, based on their choices in the experiments. For the various configurations that emerge in the
experiments, players’ contributions tend not to converge to the benchmark Nash equilibrium of the
stage game by the end of the repeated game. However, the data is consistent with the hypothesis
that players learn how to play the game over time. For the circle network structure, we find that
players learn differentially, depending on the classification of the other players in their group, and
on their relative positions within the network. The main features of the data are closely replicated
using learning simulations for each realized configuration of free-riders, altruists, and conditional
cooperators. Following the approach in Arifovic & Ledyard (2009), we generate the simulations by
merging the Individual Evolutionary Learning model with my modified model of other-regarding
preferences.
The results reported in this paper provide some important insights into the way contributions
depend on what information individuals observe about others and how the interaction between
players is structured. The simple, reactive dynamics of the IEL model, coupled with a model of other-
regarding preferences that is keyed to the information players observe between rounds, highlights
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that learning is an important channel through which information and interaction structure affect
contributions. Both of these features of an environment warrant further study, since they may have
important implications for organizational or institutional design in settings where individual and
group incentives conflict.
There are a number of extensions that follow naturally from the analysis in this paper. First
and foremost, the analysis can be replicated for a range of different network architectures and
neighborhood structures, in order to test whether the overall network structure affects behavior.
While the circle network provides a clearly defined and symmetric neighborhood structure, other
network architectures may provoke a variety of different and interesting results. Alternatively, we
may find that the effect of players’ relative positions on learning is consistent across a range of
different networks and neighborhood structures. Further work might also investigate whether the
results are sensitive to the marginal return on contributions, and the number of players, both of
which are variables that are widely acknowledged to affect contributions.
Another potential extension is to investigate conditional cooperation from the perspective of
the reciprocity literature, in which cooperation responds not only to the decisions of others, but
also to players’ beliefs about others’ contributions. In this respect, future research might pursue a
model that incorporates some of the insights and techniques used by Fischbacher & Gachter (2011),
who actually elicit subjects’ beliefs about how others will play in each round of their experiments.
Given the uncertainty subjects have about the others participating in the experiment, as well as the
considerable heterogeneity among individuals’ cooperative preferences, a formal analysis of beliefs
may complement the simpler dynamics underlying the IEL model which are used in this paper.
70
Chapter 4
Learning in Network Public Goods
Experiments
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate further the relevance of network structure for contributions in linear
public goods experiments. We use the same approach as in Chapter 3 to develop a behavioral
model that combines other-regarding preferences with the theory of learning. The approach builds
on recent work by Arifovic & Ledyard (2012).1 The previous chapter focuses on the circle network
and the variation in experimental information treatments. In contrast, we focus in this chapter on
a single information treatment, played on a set of different network structures. In all of the network
environments, players participate in a 10-period repeated network public goods game. After each
round, subjects observe the average payoff in their neighborhood, which is defined by network. As in
the previous chapter, our behavioral model provides a set of cutoff conditions on a player’s preference
parameters, which allow us to classify players as free-riders, conditional cooperators, or pure altruists
in any given environment.
We study five different network structures in this chapter; two cases in which the players are
divided into a collection of complete network components (or cliques), which we call 3-player groups
and 5-player groups; and three connected, but incomplete networks, called connected cliques, two-
step circle, and core-periphery (which is coupled with a separate 5-player clique to keep the total
1We refer the reader to the discussion of relevant literature in Chapter 3.
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number of players used constant across networks). The networks are shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Network Structures
The networks possess several different features. When players are divided into 3-player groups
or into 5-player groups, the influences from free-riders and pure altruists are isolated and contained
within the player’s group. All players in a given clique share a common neighborhood. In contrast,
the connected cliques network captures an environment in which all players’ decisions have the
indirect capacity to affect all other players’ decisions, through their neighbors, neighbors’ neighbors,
and so on. Within each (partial) clique, three players share a common neighborhood, while the
other two have distinct neighborhoods that overlap with the other (partial) cliques. In the two-step
circle network, each player has a distinct neighborhood. Players’ neighborhoods overlap, but with
more channels for behavior in one part of the network to indirectly affect behavior in a more distant
neighborhood. Finally, in the core-periphery network, players in the periphery have four neighbors,
while players in the core have six neighbors, including every other member of the core. This is the
only network we consider where some players have more neighbors than others.
This analysis in this chapter is broken into three parts. First, we study the complete network
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setting with players divided into groups of a certain size. We examine the hypothesis that average
group contributions are the same in the 3-player and 5-player environments, keeping the total return
to contributions fixed. We find that group contributions are higher in the 5-player groups. However,
the average public good consumption for each player is slightly higher in 3-player groups, due to
the higher marginal return to contributions. Nevertheless, we emphasize caution in interpreting the
findings.
Part of the reason for this caution is that, according to our behavioral theory, changing the
size of the groups also changes the incentives for players to free-ride or to give unconditionally.
Each environment induces a (potentially) different pair of cutoff conditions in the type space that
determine whether an individual has a dominant strategy to free-ride or to contribute his entire
endowment. We classify players in each group by applying a set of simple criteria to their decisions in
the experiment. While our theory suggests certain restrictions on the classifications across networks,
a within-subject analysis of player classification is not consistent with these restrictions. For instance,
we can show that a player who is a free-rider in a 3-player group, should also be a free-rider in a
5-player group. Unfortunately, in the data, we consistently observe classifications that violate the
predictions of the theory. Although this may be exacerbated somewhat by the small sample size and
the coarseness of the classification criteria, it casts a shadow on the predictions of the other-regarding
preferences component of our model, at least with respect to the static version of the game.
We also compare average contributions across 5-player groups, connected cliques, and two-step
circle networks. In each of these three network environments, every player has exactly four direct
neighbors, and the marginal per capita return to contributions is 0.4. As a result, the cutoffs for
determining free-riders and altruists are exactly the same in all three networks. In theory then,
any differences in average contributions between the networks may be driven by differences in the
network structure. We find that average contributions are highest in the 5-player groups, followed
by the connected cliques, and lowest in the two-step circle networks. However, again we exercise
caution in interpreting the data. A within-subject comparison of classifications across networks is
more consistent with the predictions of the theory, although there are still several violations, where
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a subject is classified differently in the different network environments. While this does not bode
particularly well for our theory of other-regarding preferences with respect to the static version of
the game, the combined theory of other-regarding preferences and learning, which we turn to next,
is more successful.
The second part of our analysis concerns average contributions in groups that consist entirely
of conditional cooperators. In these groups, our theory of other-regarding preferences (absent the
learning component) allows for a continuum of Nash equilibria, in which all players contribute the
same amount. Without an a priori rationale for selecting any one of these Nash equilibria, a natural
hypothesis may be that in the repeated setting, players converge to an average contribution equal to
half of the endowment. We examine this hypothesis using data from the groups in the experiments
with only conditional cooperators and then compare the results with average contributions using
simulations from our full behavioral model. In both the data and the learning-based simulations,
we find that contributions in these groups decline over time, and converge to levels below half of the
endowment. We offer a conjecture for future research, that average contributions are driven down
by the learning dynamics. If this is true, then we may be able to make an argument for using the
learning dynamics as a method of equilibrium selection.
The third, and most important part of the chapter studies the relationship between learning
and the structure of the network. Specifically, we study the hypothesis that learning is contagious
throughout the network. This hypothesis follows on from the results obtained for the circle network
in Chapter 3, which suggest that free-riders and altruists provide an anchor for learning which spreads
first to their neighbors, then on to their neighbors’ neighbors, and so on throughout the network.
We extend the analysis to the three connected networks; connected cliques, two-step circles, and
core-periphery networks. We confirm the result obtained for the circle network, that learning is
contagious, especially in the connected cliques and two-step circle networks.
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4.2 Experimental Design
We ran six experimental sessions in May and June 2012. All sessions were conducted at the Social
Sciences Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at Caltech using subjects recruited from a pool of under-
graduate and graduate students across a range of disciplines. In five of the sessions, we recruited 15
subjects, and in the other session (S3) we recruited 10 subjects.
During the experimental sessions, subjects participated in a set of matches, each of which con-
stituted a repeated network public goods game. We used different networks for different matches,
but the network structure remained fixed throughout a given match. At the start of each match,
the subjects were randomly assigned to a position on the network, so that their positions and their
neighbors were fixed for all rounds of the match. Then the subjects played 10 rounds of the same
network public goods game. Earnings were denominated in tokens throughout the experimental ses-
sion, then exchanged to US dollars at the end of the session. Average payouts were approximately
US$25, and each session lasted about one hour.
The Game. At the start of each round, we gave subjects 10 tokens and asked them to
choose how much of this endowment to contribute towards a project and how much to keep for
themselves. Subjects were allowed to contribute any number up to two decimal places, between
0 and 10 (inclusive). A subject’s payoff for the round was calculated by adding the tokens they
kept for themselves to their earnings from the project. Each subject’s earnings from the project
were determined by adding together the total number of tokens contributed by the subject and his
neighbors in the network, then multiplying this total by a return factor A. Thus, player i’s payoff
for the round was given by
Payoffi = 10− i’s contribution +A×
(∑
i’s contribution + i’s neighbors’ contributions
)
After each round, we displayed a summary screen reporting the subject’s own contribution, the total
contributions made by the subject and his neighbors in the network, the subject’s own payoff, and
the average round payoff earned by the subject and his neighbors in the network. Thus, information
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was restricted to the neighborhood level in all matches.
The Networks. In the experiments, we used the five different network structures shown in
Figure 4.1. The first two networks are complete networks, which correspond to the standard linear
public goods game. The third network, referred to as connected cliques, captures an environment in
which different clustered groups are connected to each other. The fourth network is a two-step circle,
in which each player is connected with two neighbors on each side of him, and the fifth network is
a core-periphery network, which separates the players into a central, clustered group and an outer
group of players with fewer connections. The organization of sessions is summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Organization and Order of Matches in the Experimental Sessions
In Session 3, the 10 subjects were divided into two 5-player groups, then two 5-player circles,
a paired cliques network, and a 10-player two-step circle.
Session
Network S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
3-player groups, A = 23 1 1 – – – –
5-player groups, A = 0.4 2 2 1* & 2* 1 1 1
Connected Cliques, A = 0.4 3 3 3* 3 3 & 6 3 & 6
Two-Step Circle, A = 0.4 4 4 4* 2 2 & 5 4 & 7
Core-Periphery + Clique, A = 0.4 – – – – 4 & 7 2 & 5
Total Matches 4 4 4* 3 7 7
4.3 The Model
We use a model which is based on the approach taken by Arifovic & Ledyard (2012) for linear
voluntary contributions games without networks. They merge a standard, outcome-based other-
regarding preferences model with a theory of learning. We extend the model to allow for the
network structure of the environment.
The agents have other-regarding preferences over outcomes. We provide a utility representation
for these preferences that consists of three components. First, the agents derive utility from their
own payoff. Second, they exhibit a social preference that depends on the average payoff earned
by their neighbors in the network. Third, they have a preference for fairness to self, in the sense
that they do not like to be earning less than the average payoff in their neighborhood. This third
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component may be described as envy, or as one-sided fairness.
Although we assume a common utility functional form, we allow for heterogeneity among the
agents through two parameters that represent an agent’s intensity of social preference, and his in-
tensity of preference for fairness. The equilibrium behavior induced by this utility function varies
between complete free-riding, unconditional full contribution, and conditional cooperation. An im-
portant point of distinction from the earlier literature is that these strategies do not emerge solely
from the characteristics of the agents, but rather from the confluence of their types with the param-
eters of the environment.
The theory of other-regarding preferences generates static equilibrium predictions, but provides
little insight into the dynamics of behavior in repeated public goods experiments. Thus, we combine
the model with a theory of learning, which argues that agents are boundedly rational, and that they
learn how best to play over the course of the repeated game. Another popular approach argues
that the dynamics are driven by strategic behavior, rather than learning. However, this alternative
approach rests on strong assumptions of common knowledge about both beliefs and rationality, which
are difficult to justify in 10-period repeated games with many players. Thus, although there is some
evidence consistent with strategic play in the last few rounds of repeated public goods experiments,
we focus on the learning approach.
4.3.1 Game Notation
Let I = {1, ..., n} be the set of players in the population, each with an endowment ωi = 1. Each
player must choose how much of his endowment to consume privately, and how much to allocate
towards the public good. We denote player i’s contribution to the public good by yi ∈ [0, 1] and the
profile of all players’ contributions by y = (yi)i∈I .
The players are connected through a network, denoted by an n×n matrix, G. An entry Gij = 1
indicates that player i is connected to player j. We restrict attention to undirected networks, so that
Gij = Gji for all pairs i, j, and adopt the convention Gii = 0. Let Ni(G) be the set of neighbors for
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player i in the network G. Formally,
Ni(G) = {j ∈ I|Gij = 1}. (4.1)
Let ki(G) = |Ni(G)| be player i’s degree (or number of neighbors). The level of public good enjoyed
by player i depends on his own contribution, the contributions made by his neighbors, and his
marginal per capita return to contributions, Mki+1 . That is,
Y i(G,y) =
M
ki + 1
·
[
yi +
∑
j∈Ni(G)
yj
]
. (4.2)
Player i’s payoff is given by
pii(G,y) = 1− yi + Y i(G,y). (4.3)
For each network, we assume that M is such that 1 < M < ki + 1 for each i ∈ I. This ensures that
the self-interested players face the familiar social dilemma, in which social and individual incentives
conflict.
4.3.2 Preferences
Players have other-regarding preferences over outcomes, which we capture using the utility function
Ui(G,y) = pii(G,y) + β
i ·
∑
j∈Ni(G)∪{i}
pij(G,y)
ki + 1
− γi ·max
{
0 ,
∑
j∈Ni(G)∪{i}
pij(G,y)
ki + 1
− pii(G,y)
}
.(4.4)
The two parameters βi and γi represent, respectively, player i’s relative concern for his neighborhood
and his relative concern with the fairness of his own payoff compared to social payoffs. We assume
that βi ≥ 0 and γi ≥ 0. There is a very natural interpretation of the three components to this
utility function. The first term represents personal, or self-interested preference through the player’s
own payoff. The second term corresponds to an altruistic or social preference that extends over the
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player’s neighborhood in the network, and the third term reflects the degree of envy experienced by
the player, when his own payoff is less than the average payoff in his neighborhood.
4.3.3 Learning
The agents in our model are boundedly rational individuals, who learn by reacting in a ‘best response’
manner to outcomes in past periods of play. We adopt the Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL)
model developed by Arifovic & Ledyard (2012). IEL is particularly well-suited to repeated game
environments with multiple rounds, multiple players, and continuous action spaces. Furthermore,
it is a relatively simple model, robust to the specified value of model parameters, and specifies
individual-based, reactive dynamics, in contrast with theories of social learning.
Individual Evolutionary Learning
The IEL model consists of several components. In any round, each agent retains a finite set of re-
membered actions. Each agent selects an action from his remembered set according to a probability
measure that evolves with the set. After each round, the set of remembered actions is updated
through experimentation and replication. The process is initialized by randomly populating the
set of remembered actions and assuming that each element is chosen with equal probability. The
experimentation procedure allows agents to make mistakes and to consider actions that might not
otherwise be discovered. The replication and selection processes are designed to favor actions that
would have generated higher payoffs, according to an agent-specific forgone utility function. The for-
gone utility calculations provide the channel through which we merge the other-regarding preferences
with the learning dynamics.
Experimentation involves replacing (with some small probability) some of the elements of the
remembered set with an action chosen at random from the entire action space. Replication makes,
for each slot in the remembered set, a comparison between two remembered alternatives and replaces
the action in the slot with the alternative that has a higher forgone utility for the previous round.
Selection chooses an action from the remembered set proportionately to the forgone utility it would
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have earned in the previous round.
Learning Simulations. For all simulations in this chapter, we used a remembered set of size
J = 50, and a probability of experimentation ρ = 0.033. New alternatives were selected according to
a normal distribution, conditional on the set of possible contributions [0, 10], with mean equal to the
old alternative and a standard deviation equal to σ = 5. We ran 500 iterations for each simulation,
and a simulation for each individual match in the dataset, based on the classified configuration of
players. Only the contributions of the conditional cooperators were simulated, while we set classified
free-rider and altruist contributions to be 0 tokens and 10 tokens, respectively, in each round. For the
conditional cooperators, each iteration of a simulation drew a new pair of preference parameters from
a range consistent with conditional cooperation. We incorporated the different network structures
into separate simulation code, although the underlying parameter values were the same across all
networks.
4.3.4 Equilibrium Behavior
It will be useful to derive the static equilibrium predictions for the one-shot game as a benchmark for
individual behavior. Fix the network structure G, and the set of types (βi, γi)i∈I . The equilibrium
strategies are derived from the players’ marginal utility functions ∂Ui∂yi .
Lemma 4.3.1. Player i’s marginal utility is always negative if
βi <
(ki + 1)(1−Ai)∑
j∈Ni(G)
Aj − (1−Ai) . (4.5)
Lemma 4.3.2. Player i’s marginal utility is always positive if
βi >
(ki + 1)(1−Ai)∑
j∈Ni(G)
Aj − (1−Ai) + γ
i
( ∑
j∈Ni(G)
Aj + ki(1−Ai)∑
j∈Ni(G)
Aj − (1−Ai)
)
. (4.6)
These two lemmas have a simple interpretation. If a player’s type (βi, γi) satisfies the inequality
4.5 in Lemma 4.3.1, his dominant strategy is to contribute zero. In other words, a player with
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sufficiently low social preference will always free-ride. On other hand, if (βi, γi) satisfy the inequality
4.6 in Lemma 4.3.2, player i’s dominant strategy is to contribute his entire endowment. That is,
a player with sufficiently high social preference relative to his preference for fairness, will always
contribute everything towards the public good.
If player i’s type parameters do not satisfy either of conditions 4.5 or 4.6, then utility is maximized
by choosing a contribution level that minimizes the inequality between i’s payoff and his neighbor-
hood average payoff. For any game, the equilibrium strategies for free-riders and pure altruists are
determined by condition 4.5 and condition 4.6, respectively. Then the equilibrium strategies for
conditional cooperators are derived by solving a system of linear inequalities, subject to the bound-
ary constraints on individual contributions. Whenever there exists at least one free-rider or altruist
in the group, the Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the special case when every player in
the network is a conditional cooperator, there are a continuum of equilibria, in which each player
contributes the same amount x ∈ [0, ωi].
4.4 Hypotheses
We investigate three natural hypotheses in this paper. First, we study group contributions in 3-player
groups and 5-player groups, when the return to total contributions is kept fixed. We are interested
in whether the lower marginal per capita return to contributions balances out the higher number
of players in the larger group thereby inducing the same average group contributions. Second, we
look at behavior in groups that are composed only of conditional cooperators. In theory, there are a
continuum of equilibria in these environments, where each player contributes the same amount. In
expectation, it seems natural to argue that average contributions in these groups converge to half
of the endowment. Finally, we investigate whether learning is contagious throughout the networks.
Our hypothesis of learning contagion builds on the results obtained for the circle network in Chapter
3. We outline these hypotheses below.
Hypothesis 1. Average group contributions are the same in 3-player groups as in 5-player groups.
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The intuition for this hypothesis is as follows. In both environments, the total return to group
contributions is equal to 2. The marginal return to contributions is 23 in the 3-player group, and 0.4
in the 5-player group. Thus, we might expect higher average individual contributions in the 3-player
group, but there are fewer players contributing to the group total. A natural expectation may be
that total group contributions are, on average, the same in both environments.
However, there are also reasons to doubt this hypothesis. First, according to our model of other-
regarding preferences, the cutoffs in the type space that determine who is a free-rider, who is a
conditional cooperator, and who is a pure altruist, are different for the two different group sizes. It
is relatively straightforward to show that any player with an incentive to free-ride in the 3-player
environment also has an incentive to free-ride in the 5-player environment. From Lemma 4.3.1, if
βi <
3(1− 23 )
3( 23 )−1
= 1 in the 3-player group, player i is a free-rider. In the 5-player group, the cutoff
condition is βi < 5(1−0.4)5(0.4)−1 = 3, which is higher than in the 3-player group. On the other hand, anyone
with a dominant strategy to contribute everything in the 5-player group also has a dominant strategy
to contribute everything in the 3-player group. As a result, it is possible that the same distribution
of types (underlying preference parameters) can lead to a higher percentage of free-riders and lower
percentage of pure altruists in the 5-player groups.
Second, even if the distribution of free-riders, pure altruists, and conditional cooperators is the
same in the two networks, the configuration of types on the network may have a significant impact
on contributions. For example, suppose that there are 5 subjects who are free-riders in both the
3-player and 5-player environments. Suppose further that there is exactly one of the five free-riders
in each of the five 3-player groups. Then the Nash equilibrium for each group is zero contributions
by all players. Then suppose that all five free-riders are collected in one of the three 5-player groups,
while the other two consist of all conditional cooperators. In this case, the Nash equilibrium for
the group of free-riders is zero contributions by everyone, but in the other two groups, there are a
continuum of equilibria in which every player contributes the same amount. As a result, since all the
free-riders are confined within one of the 5-player groups, the average contribution may be higher
in the 5-player environment than in the 3-player environment. There exists an analogous example
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for which the reverse is true.
Finally, we argue that if players are learning how to play the game over time, the learning dy-
namics may depend on the number of players in the group, or more generally on the structure of
the network. For instance, in 3-player groups, there may be less feedback from conditional coopera-
tors who are attempting to coordinate with each other on the utility-maximizing Nash equilibrium
contribution.
Hypothesis 2. In groups that consist only of conditional cooperators, average contributions converge
to half of the endowment.
In any group consisting of all conditional cooperators, the other-regarding preferences model
does not provide very helpful predictions. In these cases, there are a continuum of Nash equilibria,
in which all players contribute the same amount, xi = x ∈ [0, ω], ∀i ∈ I. This complicates the
coordination problem for the conditional cooperators, since they may each attempt to coordinate
on a different equilibrium contribution. This also makes it difficult for us as analysts to determine
average contributions in all-conditional cooperator groups.
A natural first-guess is that, across groups with only Cs, the average contribution is half the
endowment. This simply reflects an expectation over the action space, combined with the follow-
ing prediction. Higher-contributing players respond to the lower contributions by reducing their
contributions over the course of the repeated game, while the lower-contributing players respond
by increasing their contribution. We analyze contributions in the experiment for groups with all
conditional cooperators, both overall and by network, then compare these against the hypothesis
that they converge, on average, to half of the endowment.
Hypothesis 3. Learning is contagious throughout the network.
This hypothesis builds on the results obtained for the circle network in Chapter 3 of this disser-
tation. There, we found that players exhibit differential and contagious learning across the network,
depending on their position relative to any free-riders or altruists in the group. The intuition for
contagious learning rests on the idea that free-riders and altruists provide an anchor for learning,
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since their decisions are stable from one round to the next. Conditional cooperators who are di-
rectly connected to a free-rider or altruist are able to refine their strategies using this stability, while
those who are only connected to other conditional cooperators are faced with a difficult coordination
problem. However, once some conditional cooperators begin to learn how best to play the game, the
stability provided by the free-riders or altruists in the group spreads to other conditional cooperators,
along the links in the network. This is an important result, since it suggests that network structure
may have a significant effect on actual contributions, through its effect on learning by conditional
cooperators. In this paper, we further investigate the hypothesis that learning is contagious, for a
different set of networks.
4.5 Experimental Results
4.5.1 Player Classification
In this section, we summarize the experimental results. First, we classify the players in the experi-
ments. We classify the players in each match, using a simple set of criteria. Each player is classified
as a free-rider (F), pure altruist (A), or conditional cooperator (C), based on their decisions in the
match. We apply the criteria listed below to decisions made in rounds 3 through 10. A player
receives classification
• F if he contributes 0 in at least seven rounds;
• A if he contributes 10 in at least seven rounds;
• C otherwise.
In Table 4.2, we summarize the classifications for players in each of the network environments.
Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of the three classifications by network.
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Table 4.2: Classifications by Network
Classification
Network F C A Total
3-player groups 5 19 6 30
5-player groups 13 81 11 105
Connected Cliques 16 79 10 105
Two-step Circle 22 78 5 105
Core-Periphery 1 29 10 40
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of players in each classification for the different network environments
4.5.2 Group Contributions in Complete Networks
Next, we consider Hypothesis 1. In Figure 4.3, we plot the average group contributions for 3-player
and 5-player groups. The average for the 5-player groups is higher in all rounds. However, the
average level of public good consumption is very similar in the two environments, since the rate of
return is lower in the 5-player groups. This similarity is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
These findings should be interpreted with care, since there may be a different distribution of
free-riders, pure altruists, and conditional cooperators in the two environments. In the 3-player
groups, a player with altruistic parameter βi < 1 has a dominant strategy incentive to free-ride,
while in the 5-player groups, any player with βi < 3 has the same incentive to free-ride. Thus, if
underlying types (utility parameters) are stable across environments, a player who free-rides in a
3-player group also free-rides in a 5-player group. Similarly, any pure altruist in a 5-player group
will also be a pure altruist in a 3-player group. These differences in the free-rider and pure altruist
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Figure 4.4: Average public good consumption in 3-player and 5-player groups
cutoffs could, in theory, induce lower average individual contributions in 5-player groups than in
3-player groups.
Although the sample sizes are different, we find a higher proportion of free-riders in the 3-player
groups than in the 5-player groups. This is not consistent with our theory, although it is possible
that the reversal is driven by differences in the sample sizes. Nevertheless, by analyzing the within-
subject classifications for 3-player and 5-player groups, we can determine whether players are stable
across environments. Unfortunately, the within-subject analysis is also fairly inconsistent with the
predictions of the model with respect to cutoffs in the type space.
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librium, all players
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Figure 4.5: 3-player group configurations and their Nash equilibria
Of the five subjects who are classified free-riders in their 3-player group, only one is also classified
as a free-rider in his 5-player group. The other four are each classified as conditional cooperators,
which is inconsistent with the order of the cutoffs, derived from our theory of other-regarding pref-
erences. The contributions of those conditional cooperators are, in a few cases, only marginally
excluded from a free-rider classification, but in general, this suggests that either the theory does not
predict well, or that subjects are not particularly stable across environments. Similarly, the only
subject who is classified as a pure altruist in the 5-player group, and who also played in a 3-player
group, is classified as a conditional cooperator in the latter, contrary to theoretical predictions.
In addition to these concerns, group contributions can also depend on the configuration of types
in the group. For instance, even if within-subject classifications were perfectly robust and consistent
with the theory, the way the players are configured among the groups may change the comparative
average contributions. On examining the configurations in the two environments, we find that the
set of configurations is quite similar for 3-player groups as for 5-player groups. The configurations,
and the corresponding Nash equilibria, are illustrated in Figure 4.5 (for 3-player groups), and Figure
4.6 (for 5-player groups).
In the 3-player groups, there are two AAA configurations, one FFF configuration, and one FCF
configuration. On average, contributions from these four matches should be half of the endowment.
The other six groups consist entirely of conditional cooperators. In these configurations, there are
a continuum of equilibria, in which every player contributes the same amount. Among the 5-player
groups, there are similarly balanced configurations, with six groups composed of only F s and Cs,
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Figure 4.6: 5-player group configurations and their Nash equilibria
five groups composed of only As and Cs, two groups with one F , one A, and three Cs, and eight
groups that consist of all Cs. The groups with free-riders (and Cs) and the groups with altruists
(and Cs) should average each other out to half the endowment.
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4.5.3 Groups Composed Solely of Conditional Cooperators
As discussed in Section 4.3.4 and Section 4.4, there are a continuum of equilibria in matches composed
of all conditional cooperators. A natural expectation is that the average contributions in these
matches converge to half of the endowment. However, in our learning simulations, we find that
contributions in these matches tend to converge to values significantly below half of the endowment.
We conjecture that learning dynamics drive the average contributions down, and that different
networks generate different learning dynamics. It may be possible to use these learning dynamics as
a method of equilibrium selection, particularly as it explains the well-documented decay in average
contributions over time, even for groups that consist solely of conditional cooperators. We leave a
deeper analysis of this conjecture for future research.
In our data, there are six groups of all conditional cooperators in 3-player groups, eight groups
of all conditional cooperators in 5-player groups, and one group of all conditional cooperators on a
two-step circle. We show the average contributions in learning simulations for the 3-player groups
and 5-player groups in Figure 4.7. We also plot the average contributions in the data for those groups
with all conditional cooperators. For 5-player groups, we find that the data follows the simulations
quite closely, as average contributions decline over time to a level below half of the endowment. The
simulation averages converge to approximately 2.5 tokens, and while the data average starts at more
than half of the endowment, it falls into line with the simulation average by round 5. On the other
hand, the data average for 3-player groups begins and remains higher than half the endowment for
most rounds, while the simulations decline steadily below 5 tokens and converge to approximately
3.3 tokens by the end of the 10 rounds. Nevertheless, the data average also appears to decline
over time. The observation that average contributions are much lower for groups composed of all
Cs in 5-player groups than in the 3-player groups may partly explain why we find average group
contributions to be slightly lower in 5-player groups than in 3-player groups.
Although there is not enough data to do the same analysis for the other networks, Figure 4.8
shows the predictions of the learning simulations for the connected cliques, two-step circle, and
core-periphery networks when all players are conditional cooperators. All three networks exhibit
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Figure 4.7: Average contributions in groups with all conditional cooperators
virtually identical patterns of average contributions, beginning at 5 tokens and declining to 4 tokens
by the end of the simulated game.
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Figure 4.8: Average simulated contributions in groups with all conditional cooperators
4.5.4 Average Contributions in Networks with 5-Player Neighborhoods
In this section, we compare contributions across the three network environments in which every
player is part of a 5-player neighborhood, and the marginal per capita return to contributions is 0.4.
These networks are the 5-player groups (or cliques), the connected cliques network, and the two-step
circle network. The cutoffs in the type space for determining free-riders and altruists are exactly the
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same in all three networks, so in theory, the distribution of players should be the same. We do allow
for some expected differences, since there are some players who play on all three networks twice,
while others only play on the connected cliques and two-step circle networks twice.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the average contributions in each of the three networks. The data indicate
average contributions are highest in the 5-player groups, followed by the connected cliques, and
lowest in the two-step circle networks.
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Figure 4.9: Average contributions in 5-player groups, connected cliques, and two-step circle networks
As in the previous subsection, we exercise caution in interpreting this data. First, although the
proportion of conditional cooperators is very stable across the three networks, there are progressively
fewer altruists and more free-riders as we move from 5-player groups, to connected cliques, to two-
step circles. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that these differences in the distribution of types
are responsible for the differences in average contributions. As with the comparison of the complete
networks in the previous subsection, the configuration of those types on the network may also have
important effects on contributions.
A within-subject comparison suggests somewhat more consistency in classifications than we found
between 3-player and 5-player groups. Our model predicts that a subject should be classified the
same way in all three networks. There are 26 (out of 75) subjects who are classified differently across
the three networks. Five of the subjects who participated twice in the connected cliques and two-step
circle networks, were classified differently in just one of their 5 matches. Furthermore, in the first
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session, 7 out of the 9 inconsistent subjects were classified C in both the 5-player groups and the
connected cliques, then classified F in the two-step circle environment. This dramatic shift towards
free-riding in the two-step circle, which was the final match played by the subjects in that session,
raises the possibility that behavior in later matches is influenced by earlier matches. In our design,
we varied the order of matches across most sessions, although the setup makes it difficult to prevent
all order effects from influencing the data. Although this is an improvement on the consistency of
classifications between the 3-player and 5-player groups, it does not provide much support for the
predictions of our theory.
4.5.5 Learning in Networks with 5-Player Neighborhoods
In Figure 4.10, we compare the absolute difference between individuals’ contributions (averaged over
rounds 8–10) and their corresponding Nash equilibrium contribution. For matches composed of all
conditional cooperators, we used the absolute difference between the 3-period data average and the
average contribution in round 10 of the learning simulations for that network. The average difference
is highest for the connected cliques, and almost equal for 5-player groups and two-step circles. This
suggests that perhaps conditional cooperators are slower to learn in connected cliques, than in 5-
player groups or two-step circles. However, it seems necessary to acknowledge that learning depends
crucially on the realized distribution of types and their configuration on the network, rather than
the underlying structure of the network itself. Thus, we focus the rest of the analysis on learning at
the individual match level.
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Figure 4.10: Absolute differences between 3-period average contribution (rd 8–10) and Nash equilibrium. The mean is shown by the horizontal line
at 2.1165 (5-player), 3.286 (connected cliques), and 2.169 (two-step circle).
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4.5.6 Learning Contagion in the Incomplete Networks
In this section, we examine the evidence of contagious learning in the connected cliques, two-step
circle, and core-periphery networks. We focus on the data at the individual match level, and compare
actual contributions with the learning simulations for each realized configuration.
Evidence from Connected Cliques
Session 1, Match 3. In this match, there are four free-riders, located at nodes 2, 6, 7, and
8, as shown in Figure 4.11. In the figure, we use large, red circles to denote the free-riders, then
use color and size changes to indicate the relative speeds at which we hypothesize the players are
learning. The slower the player learns, the smaller the circle. The color of the node changes from red
(free-riders) and orange (fast) to a pale cream, then to progressively darker shades of blue (slowest).
In this configuration, the hypothesis that learning is contagious suggests that players 9 and 10
should converge relatively quickly towards the Nash equilibrium contribution of zero. Players 1, 3,
4, and 5 (player 2’s neighbors) should be close behind, followed by players 14 and 15, while players
11, 12, and 13 are most likely the slowest to converge towards zero.
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Figure 4.11: Configuration in Session 1, Match 3
Our intuition is validated by both the learning simulations and the experimental data for this
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configuration. The free-riders provide an anchor, which facilitates learning by their immediate
neighbors. The stabilizing effects of the anchors then spread throughout the rest of the network. We
show the individual contributions and the simulated contributions for each conditional cooperator
in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Experimental data and learning simulations in Session 1, Match 3
Session 2, Match 3. In this match, there is one altruist (player 5) and one free-rider (player
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Figure 4.13: Configuration in Session 2, Match 3
15). We solve for the Nash equilibrium from the appropriate set of inequalities, subject to the
boundary constraints on contributions, and obtain
y∗1 = 10, y
∗
2 = 10, y
∗
3 = 10, y
∗
4 = 9.654, y
∗
5 = 10
y∗6 = 5.255, y
∗
7 = 5.255, y
∗
8 = 5.255, y
∗
9 = 3.483, y
∗
10 = 6.782
y∗11 = 0, y
∗
12 = 0, y
∗
13 = 0, y
∗
14 = 2.5, y
∗
15 = 0.
There are several symmetric players in this network. Player 1, 2, and 3 are in identical positions
as one another. Likewise, players 6, 7, and 8 face the same incentives as each other, and players
11, 12, and 13 are symmetric with one another. In the network, we expect players 1, 2, and 3 to
learn quite quickly, since their contributions are well-anchored against the unconditional giving of
player 5. Similarly, players 11, 12, and 13 learn from their free-rider neighbor, player 15, but are also
reinforced by player 14, who is one of player 5’s neighbors. Spreading out from those two partial
cliques, we expect player 4 to be slower to learn their Nash equilibrium contribution, while player
10 and players 6, 7, and 8 are the slowest to learn, as they are isolated from the stabilizing effects
of a free-rider or altruist. In Figure 4.14, we show the actual and simulated contributions for each
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player over all 10 rounds.
As in Session 1, Match 3, there is some evidence of contagious learning. Players 11, 12, and 13
converge quickly towards their Nash equilibrium contribution (zero) in both simulations and data,
while players 6, 7, and 8 are relatively far from their equilibrium contribution in the data. However,
player 4 and player 14 behave differently from the simulations. Since players 1, 2, and 3 do not
converge to their equilibrium contributions particularly quickly, player 4 is equally slow, particu-
larly since his other neighbor, player 10 is also isolated and contributes less than his equilibrium
contribution. On the other hand, player 14, whose equilibrium contribution is 2.5 tokens, converges
relatively quickly to a low contribution, even converging to zero in the last two rounds. This reflects
the relative speed with which players 11, 12, and 13 learn, which strongly affirms the hypothesis
of contagious learning. The evidence from other matches generally provides good support for the
hypothesis of contagious learning. We relegate the analysis of these other matches to Appendix ...
Evidence from Two-Step Circles
Session 1, Match 4. In this match, there are 11 free-riders, and only 4 conditional cooperators (at
nodes 2, 3, 9, and 12). The Nash equilibrium contribution for every player is 0. We expect all four
players to converge quite quickly to zero contributions. If anything, players 9 and 12 may converge
slightly faster, since they each have four free-rider neighbors, while players 2 and 3 are connected to
each other, and three free-riders each. We display the configuration and conjecture some differential
learning for the network in Figure 4.15.
Indeed, as is shown in Figure 4.16, all four conditional cooperators converge to the Nash equilib-
rium contribution (zero) by the last few rounds. Player 12 is marginally quicker to reach and stay at
zero contributions, although there is not much difference in the speed of learning, since all of them
are well connected to the free-riders in the network.
Session 2, Match 4. In this match, there are only 2 free-riders, located at nodes 5 and 6. All
other players are conditional cooperators. The Nash equilibrium contribution for every player is 0.
Since the free-riders are located right next to each other in the circle, there is a very natural pathway
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Figure 4.14: Experimental data and learning simulations in Session 2, Match 3
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Figure 4.15: Configuration in Session 1, Match 4
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Figure 4.16: Experimental data and learning simulations in Session 1, Match 4
for learning to spread throughout the network. We expect player 4 to learn more quickly, due to the
stabilizing decision-making by players 5 and 6. Likewise for player 7, who is located on the other
side of players 5 and 6. We expect to see learning spread from neighbor to neighbor, moving away
from the two free-riders in each direction, until we reach player 13, who is farthest removed from
players 5 and 6. Figure 4.17 illustrates the configuration and the hypothesized spread of learning
around the network.
In Figure 4.18, we show that this pattern of learning contagion is reflected in both the simulations
and the data. Players 4 and 7 converge to zero contributions within two or three rounds. Player 8
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Figure 4.17: Configuration in Session 2, Match 4
is also quick to begin playing the Nash equilibrium contribution, although player 3 seems to learn
more slowly. In turn, player 8’s neighbors, player 9 and player 10, learn considerably faster than
players 1 and 2, who are neighbors to player 3. Finally, for player 11, 12, 14, and 15, contributions
only start to approach zero in the later rounds of the match. This exhibition of contagious learning
is particularly stark in the data, and especially well-portrayed by the differences in learning as we
move around the circle in opposite directions.
Session 6, Match 4. In this match, there are four altruists (at nodes 2, 4, 6, and 7), and one
free-rider (at node 10). The Nash equilibrium contributions for the conditional cooperators are
y∗1 = 7.76, y
∗
3 = 10, y
∗
5 = 10, y
∗
8 = 6.12, y
∗
9 = 3.21
y∗11 = 0, y
∗
12 = 0, y
∗
13 = 0, y
∗
14 = 2.24, y
∗
15 = 5.
In this match, our predictions about learning contagion are somewhat mixed compared with the
previous matches. On the one hand, players 3 and 5 remain several tokens below their Nash equilib-
rium contributions, despite being surrounded by several pure altruists. Player 8 seems to be on the
right track, until player 9, who doesn’t learn as quickly as we might expect, drops his contribution
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Figure 4.18: Experimental data and learning simulations in Session 2, Match 4
101
5
8
11
14
2
13
15
4
3
1
12
10
9
7
6
Figure 4.19: Configuration in Session 6, Match 4
from 10 to 0, after which player 8 also diverges away from his equilibrium contribution. On the other
hand, some of the players who we expect to take longer at learning their equilibrium contributions
actually learn quickly. Player 11 (perhaps also aided by player 9’s zero contributions) converges
to 0 (his equilibrium level) by round 6, and consequently, so does player 12, whose learning relies
partially on how quickly player 11 learns. The contagion effect seems to be strong in this part of
the network, so much so that even players 13 and 14, who we predict to be the slowest to converge
to their equilibrium contributions, are close by the end of the ten rounds. Thus, although the pre-
dictions are not met with respect to some of the more likely players, there is considerable support
for contagious learning on the other side of the network.
Evidence from the Core-Periphery Networks
Session 5, Match 4. Consider the configuration shown in Figure 4.21, which represents Session 5,
Match 4. There is a single free-rider, player 3, who is in the periphery of the network. In this setting,
there are two Nash equilibria. In one, every player contributes zero. In the other, every player in
the periphery contributes 0, while every player in the core contributes the full endowment of 10
tokens. We ran learning simulations for this configuration over 100 periods and found that players’
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contributions converge to the latter equilibrium, with core players contributing 10 tokens. Likewise
in the 10-period simulations, average contributions for the core players trend upwards, reaching
approximately 7 tokens for players 6, 7, and 8, and 6 tokens for player 9 and 10. This highlights
an interesting twist on the type of learning contagion observed for circles, connected cliques, and
two-step circle networks. In this network, player 3 acts as an anchor which prevents players 9 and
10 from learning, rather than enhance their learning.
The learning predictions in this case are not as clear as in other networks. First, we predict that
the learning will spread around the periphery from player 3 to his immediate peripheral neighbors,
players 2 and 4, then on to players 1 and 5. At the same time, all the players in the core, since
they are conditional cooperators, will attempt to equalize their own payoff with the average payoff
of their neighborhood. Since they have more neighbors than the peripheral players, their payoffs
are higher than the peripheral players’ payoffs, even if those players are free-riding. As a result,
we expect the learning dynamics to drive the contributions up for the core players, until they reach
the full endowment. In this configuration, the core players who are not connected to the free-rider
(player 3) should begin to learn this optimal strategy relatively fast, while those who are connected
to player 3 may be slowed by the lower contributions. As players 2 and 5, followed by player 1
learn to play their zero contributions Nash equilibrium strategy, there may be some initial resistance
from the players in the core, although all of the players would eventually converge to their Nash
equilibrium contributions if they played long enough.
We plot the actual contributions against the simulated contributions in Figure 4.22.
4.6 Conclusion
Our main finding in this chapter is that behavior in a range of different network structures is
consistent with the hypothesis of contagious learning. We provide extensive evidence at the individ-
ual match level that learning spreads from the anchoring contributions of free-riders and altruists,
through the network via their neighbors and their neighbors’ neighbors. This evidence reinforces
the result obtained in Chapter 3 for the circle network. We hope that this finding will motivate
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further research into the relationship between learning and network structure, both in public goods
experiments and in other experimental games.
We also have examined contributions in groups consisting only of conditional cooperators, finding
that average contributions typically decline over time, to a level below half of the endowment. We
conjecture that this may be related to the learning dynamics, and that if so, learning dynamics may
provide a means of selecting an equilibrium from among the multiple that exist for groups with only
conditional cooperators. This conjecture is another avenue for future research into the behavior of
individuals in repeated network public goods games.
Finally, we do also observe subject behavior which is inconsistent with the predictions of the
other-regarding preferences component of our behavioral model. This makes it difficult to compare
average contributions, or average public good consumption across networks, since differences in the
contributions may reflect a different composition of free-riders, altruists, and conditional cooperators,
or even a different set of configurations. Still, with more data, and perhaps with a little more control
over the precise conditions, compositions, and configurations across networks, we may be able to
make more meaningful comparisons and discover more about the relationship between network
structure and contributions.
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Figure 4.20: Experimental data and learning simulations in Session 6, Match 4
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Figure 4.21: Configuration in Session 5, Match 4
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Figure 4.22: Experimental data and learning simulations in Session 5, Match 4
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
The equilibrium strategies are derived from the players’ marginal utility functions. Let y be the
profile of contributions and suppose that yi is less than the average contribution made by player i’s
reference group,
yi <
∑
j∈Ri
yj
|Ri| . (A.1)
Then player i’s marginal utility from increasing yi is
βi
|Ri| − (1−A). (A.2)
On the other hand, if yi is greater than the average contribution made by player i’s reference group,
yi >
∑
j∈Ri
yj
|Ri| , (A.3)
then player i’s marginal utility from increasing yi is
βi + γi − (1−A+ γi)|Ri|
|Ri| . (A.4)
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Since γi > 0 and |Ri| ≥ 2, the expression in (A.2) is strictly greater than the expression in (A.4).
Thus, for any profile of contributions y, player i’s marginal utility of her own contribution is non-
negative whenever the expression in (A.4) is nonnegative, i.e., when
βi ≥ (1−A+ γi)|Ri| − γi, (A.5)
and nonpositive whenever the expression in (A.2) is nonpositive, i.e., when
βi ≤ (1−A)|Ri|. (A.6)
A player who does not satisfy either of the inequalities in (A.5) or (A.6) is a conditional co-
operator, for whom marginal utility is positive when her contribution is lower than the average
contribution in her reference group, and negative when her contribution is more than the average in
her reference group. Thus, for each profile of others’ contributions, her best response is to contribute
the average amount contribute by the other players in her reference group.
The Nash equilibrium of a given realization of this game is solved in the following manner.
First, classify the altruists and free-riders, whose equilibrium behavior is unconditional. Then find
the equilibrium contributions of the conditional cooperators as the solution to a system of linearly
independent equalities.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Let y be the profile of contributions and suppose that pii is greater than the average payoff in player
i’s reference group,
pii ≥
∑
j∈Ri
pij
|Ri| . (A.7)
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Then player i’s marginal utility from increasing yi is
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|
|Ri| Aβ
i − (1−A)
(
1 +
βi
|Ri|
)
. (A.8)
On the other hand, if pii is less than the average payoff in player i’s reference group,
pii ≤
∑
j∈Ri
pij
|Ri| , (A.9)
then player i’s marginal utility from increasing yi is
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|
|Ri| A(β
i − γi)− (1−A)(1 + γi + β
i − γi
|Ri| ). (A.10)
As with the previous case, since γi > 0 and |Ri| ≥ 2, the expression in (A.8) is strictly greater than
the expression in (A.10). Thus, for any profile of contributions y, player i’s marginal utility of her
own contribution is nonnegative whenever the expression in (A.10) is nonnegative, i.e., when
βi ≥ γi + (1 + γ
i)(1−A)|Ri|
A
(
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|+ 1
)
− 1
, (A.11)
and nonpositive whenever the expression in (A.8) is nonpositive, i.e., when
βi ≤ (1−A)|Ri|
A
(
|Ni(G) ∪Ri|+ 1
)
− 1
. (A.12)
These two inequalities can be interpreted in the same way as for the variation of the game in which
players use average contribution as their reference statistic. First, if player i is sufficiently altruistic,
then her best response to any profile of others’ contributions is to contribute everything. On the
other hand, if player i is self-interested enough, then her best response is always to contribute
nothing. The first player is an altruist, and the second is a free-rider.
A player who does not satisfy either of the inequalities in (A.11) or (A.12) is a conditional
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cooperator, for whom marginal utility is positive when her payoff is greater than the average payoff
in her reference group, and negative when her payoff is less than the average in her reference group.
Thus, for each profile of others’ contributions, her best response is to contribute an amount that
equalizes her payoff with the average payoff earned by the players in her reference group. That is, if
(1−A)|Ri|
A
(
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|+ 1
)
− 1
< βi <
(1 + γi)(1−A)|Ri|
(1− γi)
[
A
(
|Ni(G) ∩Ri|+ 1
)
− 1
] , (A.13)
then player i’s best response to y−i is to choose y∗i such that
pii(G, (y
∗
i ,y−i)) =
∑
j∈Ri
pij(G, (y
∗
i ,y−i))
|Ri| . (A.14)
The Nash equilibrium of a given realization of this game can be solved for using similar steps as
for the first variation of the game, with one important difference. First, classify the altruists and
free-riders, whose equilibrium behavior is unconditional. Then find the equilibrium contributions of
the conditional cooperators as the solution to a system of linear inequalities of the form in equation
(A.14), subject to the feasibility constraints on the players’ actions. These additional constraints on
the system of equations are the key difference between the first and second variations of the game.
For some players, it may be the case that, in equilibrium, they would like to contribute a negative
amount, or contribute more than their endowment, in order to equalize their payoff with the average
payoff of their reference group. Thus, solving for the equilibrium behavior is slightly more difficult
in this variation of the game than in the game where players care about average contribution.
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Appendix B
Supplementary Analysis for
Chapter 3
This Appendix provides more detailed analysis of the evidence for Result 3.5.1 and Result 3.5.2.
It complements the snapshot provided in Section 3.5. The analysis is broken down by information
treatment for ease of comparison.
Treatment 1
In Figure B.1, I reproduce the 3-period average contributions of each player for a subset of the
individual matches played under Treatment 1. Players who are conditional cooperator types are
shown in black, while the free-rider and altruist types are shown in light gray. In Match 1a, there
are two adjacent free-riders; in 2b and 3a, there are 4 adjacent free-riders; and in Match 4b, there
is just one free-rider. In all of these matches, the benchmark Nash equilibrium is for every player
to contribute 0. The subfigures highlight the fact that for Matches 2b and 3a, the contributions of
the conditional cooperators are lower on average than the contributions made by the conditional
cooperators in Matches 1a and 4b.
Match 4b provides support for Result 3.5.2, since the players’ contributions are clearly increasing
as we move further away Player 1 (the lone free-rider), peak at Player 4, who is the farthest away
from the free-rider, then decrease as we move closer to the free-rider around the circle network.
Still looking at Treatment 1, both Result 3.5.1 and Result 3.5.2 are also supported by Match 1b
(which has 1 altruist) and Match 4a (which has 4 altruists), which are compared in Figure B.2. In
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(b) Match 2b
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
100	  
3a-­‐1	   3a-­‐2	   3a-­‐3	   3a-­‐4	   3a-­‐5	   3a-­‐6	  
3-­‐
Pe
rio
d	  
Av
er
ag
e	  
Co
nt
rib
u3
on
	  
Player	  
Treatment	  1	  -­‐	  Match	  3a	  
Configura3on:	  	  	  F	  F	  F	  C	  C	  F	  
(c) Match 3a
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Figure B.1: Treatment 1 matches with free-riders and conditional cooperators only
both matches, the benchmark Nash equilibrium is for all conditional cooperators to contribute their
endowment of 100. As we can see, the contributions of the conditional cooperators are significantly
higher in Match 4a than in Match 1b. Moreover, in Match 1b, simulation and actual contributions
are declining as we move further away from Player 3, who is the lone altruist, which supports Result
3.5.2.
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Figure B.2: Treatment 1 matches with altruists and conditional cooperators only
Treatment 2
In Treatment 2, there are two matches with 1 free-rider (3a and 4b), two matches with 2 adjacent
free-riders (3b and 5b), 2 matches with 3 adjacent free-riders (1b and 2a), and 1 match with 5
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free-riders (2b). these matches support Result 3.5.1, and all except for Match 4b illustrate the
dependence on relative positions summarized in Result 3.5.2. Comparing the left column with the
middle column and the right column in Figure B.3, gives a good indication of how, even though
all of these matches have the same benchmark Nash equilibrium (zero contributions by everyone),
the contributions of the conditional cooperators are positive and decreasing in the number of free-
riders in the match. Moreover, aside from Match 4b, contributions are higher for players who are
positioned further from the free-riders than for those who are closer, which supports Result 3.5.2.
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(a) Match 3a
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(b) Match 3b
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(c) Match 1b
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(d) Match 4b
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(e) Match 5b
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Figure B.3: Treatment 2 matches with free-riders and CCs only. The number of free-riders in the matches is increasing from left to right.
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(b) Match 2b
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(c) Match 3a
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Figure B.4: Treatment 3 matches with free-riders and CCs only
Treatment 3
Treatment 3 provides the most remarkable evidence to support Result 3.5.2. Consider the matches
displayed in Figure B.4. In Match 1a, contributions are monotonically increasing for both simulations
and data, as we move further away from Player 4 who is the sole free-rider. The same is true in
Match 2b as we move away from Players 2 and 3 (the free-riders), Match 3a as we move further
away from Player 1, and Match 3b as we move away from Player 5.
Treatment 4
Figure B.5 reproduces Matches 5b (2 altruists), 1a (3 altruists), and 4b (4 altruists) under Treatment
4. In support of Result 3.5.1, the contributions of the conditional cooperator types are highest in
Match 4b, and lowest in Match 5b. On the other hand, Figure B.6 displays four matches under
Treatment 4 that exhibit support for Result 3.5.2.
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Figure B.5: Treatment 4 matches — Contributions and the # of altruists
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Figure B.6: Treatment 4 matches — Effects of players’ relative positions
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Appendix C
Experiment Instructions for
Chapter 3
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment, please give us
your full attention and follow the instructions carefully. Please turn off your cell phones, and refrain
from chatting with other subjects, opening other applications on your computer, or engaging in
other activities. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid discreetly in cash, based on the
payoffs you earn. What you earn depends partly on your own decisions, partly on the decisions of
others, and partly on chance. Do not talk or try to communicate with other participants during the
experiment.
Following these instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehension quiz.
You must answer all questions on the quiz correctly before you can continue to the paid sessions.
In the experiment, your earnings will be denominated in tokens. At the end, these earnings will be
converted to US dollars at the rate of 500 tokens to 1 US Dollar.
This experiment consists of four matches. In each match, there will be 15 rounds. For each
match, you will be divided into TWO groups of SIX members each. You will be randomly assigned
to exactly one of these two groups and you will not know who out of the other participants is in your
group. Do not let any other subject know which group you are in. You will remain in this group
for the entire first match. For each other match, you will be randomly rematched into two (possibly
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different) groups of SIX members each. Thus, your group will be fixed during a given match, but
may be different across matches. Other than the set of players in each group, the parameters and
the features of the match will be the same for both groups.
Each match will proceed as follows. At the start of the match, you will be randomly assigned to
a position (node) in the network depicted in Figure C.1. The other 5 members of your group will
be assigned to the other positions, so that only one member is at any position, and all positions are
filled.
 
  
 
 
 
Figure C.1: Circle network with 6 agents
The match will consist of 15 rounds. During the match, your position will be identified by a
node labeled “You” and a player number. Your player number and your location will remain fixed
throughout each round of the match. Likewise, your group members, and their locations will be
fixed throughout each round of the match. If your node is connected to another node, then that
node will be displayed in red to indicate the connection. The players located at the red nodes are
your direct neighbors in the network.
In each round, you will face exactly the same decision problem. At the start of every round,
you will be given an endowment of 100 tokens. You must decide how much of this endowment to
contribute to a given project, and how much to keep for yourself. You cannot contribute a negative
amount nor can you contribute more than 100 tokens towards the project. You may choose any
number up to two decimal places within that range. In a given round, your earnings from the project
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Figure C.2: The decision screen for a match
depend on your allocation to the project in that round and the allocations made by your direct
neighbors in that round. Specifically, your earnings from the project are calculated by adding your
contribution and the contributions of your direct neighbors, then multiplying the total by the
return factor, which is 0.6. Your earnings from the project will then be added to whatever number
of tokens you keep (which will be 100 minus your contribution) to give your overall payoff from the
round.
For example, suppose you allocate 40 tokens to the project and keep 60 tokens for yourself,
and the sum of the allocations made by your direct neighbors to the project is 80. Then your
earnings from the project will be
0.6 · (40 + 80) = 72,
while your earnings from the tokens you keep will be 60. Thus, your total earnings would be
Earnings = 72 + 60 = 132.
To summarize, your payoffs in a given round will be equal to
payoff = 100− your contribution + 0.6× ( total contributions by you and your neighbors ).
Each round is a separate decision problem, so your earnings in any round will depend only on
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Figure C.3: The round summary screen for a match
the decisions made by you and your direct neighbors in that round. After each round, you will
see certain information about what happened. This information will be different for each match,
as will be described below and before the match. You will be given 30 seconds after each round to
observe the information, then we will move to the next round. At the end of the match, all of your
round payoffs will be added together to give your match payoffs. At the end of the last match, your
match payoffs will be summed and converted into US dollars according to the exchange rate above.
After each round, you will see the following information in all matches.
• The amount that you contributed to the project
• The total contributions to the project from you AND your direct neighbors
• Your payoff from the round
In addition, match specific information will be provided as specified before each match.
Match 1
The average payoff received by you and your direct neighbors
Match 2
The average payoff received by all SIX players in your group
Match 3
The average contribution made by you and your direct neighbors
122
Match 4
The average contribution made by all SIX players in your group
Now we will run through a practice match with 4 rounds, so that you can familiarize yourself
with the software. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. You will not be paid for this
practice session. After the practice match, there will be a short quiz for you to answer, before you
can proceed to the paid matches. As a reminder, please do not communicate with the other subjects
in any way. Good luck.
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Appendix D
Experiment Instructions for
Chapter 4
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment, please give us
your full attention and follow the instructions carefully. Please turn off your cell phones, and refrain
from chatting with other subjects, opening other applications on your computer, or engaging in
other activities. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid discreetly in cash, based on the
payoffs you earn. How much you earn depends partly on your own decisions, partly on the decisions
of others, and partly on chance. Please do not try to communicate with other participants during
the experiment.
Following these instructions, there will be an unpaid practice session and a short comprehension
quiz. You must answer all questions on the quiz correctly before you can continue to the paid sessions.
In the experiment, your earnings will be denominated in tokens. At the end, these earnings will
be converted to US dollars at the rate of 50 tokens to 1 US Dollar. The experiment consists of
seven parts, called matches. Each match will be described separately before it is played.
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Match 1 (unpaid practice) and Match 2
In this match, you will be divided into THREE (3) groups of FIVE (5) members each. You will be
randomly assigned to one of these groups and you will not know who out of the other participants
is in your group. Your group will remain the same throughout the match. The practice (unpaid)
match will consist of 3 rounds, followed by a short comprehension quiz. The paid Match 2 will
consist of 10 rounds. In each round, you will face exactly the same decision problem.
The Decision Problem
At the start of every round, you will be given an endowment of 10 tokens. You must decide how
much of this endowment to contribute to a given project, and how much to keep for yourself. You
may contribute any number, up to two decimal places, between 0 and 10, inclusive. In a given round,
your earnings will be the sum of your earnings from the project and the number of tokens you keep
for yourself. Your earnings from the project are calculated by taking the total number of tokens
contributed to the project by the members of your group, and multiplying it by a return factor of
0.4. These earnings from the project will be added to the tokens you keep for yourself to give your
overall payoff from the round.
For example, suppose you allocate 6 tokens to the project, keeping 4 tokens for yourself, and
suppose the sum of the allocations made by the other members of your group is 14 tokens. Your
earnings from the project will be
0.4 · (6 + 14) = 8.
Your overall earnings will be the 4 tokens you keep for yourself plus the 8 tokens you earn from the
project, for a total of 12 tokens. Each round is a separate decision problem, so your earnings in any
round depend only on the decisions made by you and your group members in that round.
After each round, you will be shown
• how many tokens you allocated to the project,
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• the total number of tokens allocated to the project in your group (including yours),
• your payoff from the round,
• the average payoff earned by the members of your group (including you).
Matches 3–8
In these matches, you will be randomly assigned to a position in a particular network graph. These
are shown below. The decision problem will be the same for each match, although the network and
your neighbors (the players to whom you are connected) will change across matches. Your neighbors
in the network will be the participants assigned to positions (or nodes) that are linked by an edge
to your position (node). All positions are fixed throughout a given match. Each match will consist
of 10 rounds. In each round, you will face exactly the same decision problem.
The Decision Problem
At the start of every round, you will be given an endowment of 10 tokens. You must decide how
much of this endowment to contribute to a given project, and how much to keep for yourself. You
may contribute any number, up to two decimal places, between 0 and 10, inclusive. In a given round,
your earnings from the project are calculated by taking the total number of tokens contributed to
the project by you and your neighbors in the network, and multiplying it by a return factor of 0.4.
Your earnings from the project will be added to the tokens you keep for yourself to give your overall
payoff from the round.
For example, suppose you allocate 7 tokens to the project, keeping 3 tokens for yourself, and
suppose the sum of the allocations made by your neighbors in the network is 28 tokens. Your
earnings from the project will be
0.4 · (7 + 28) = 14.
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Your overall earnings will be the 3 tokens you keep for yourself plus the 14 tokens you earn from
the project, for a total of 17 tokens. Each round is a separate decision problem, so your earnings in
any round depend only on the decisions made by you and your neighbors in that round.
After each round, you will be shown
• how many tokens you allocated to the project,
• the total number of tokens allocated to the project by you and your neighbors,
• your payoff from the round,
• the average payoff earned by you and your neighbors.
The networks are summarized below.
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Figure D.1: Match 3 network graph
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Figure D.2: Match 4 network graph
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Figure D.3: Match 5 network graph
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Figure D.4: Match 6 network graph
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Figure D.5: Match 7 network graph
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Figure D.6: Match 8 network graph
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